Strategy

Most startup companies today consider overseas expansion from their inception. Yet, says the author, entrepreneurs and their managers often underestimate the cost of expansion and lack a clear conceptual framework for it. On the basis of studying 50 entrepreneurial ventures in more than 20 countries, he concludes that such ventures follow a variety of different expansion paths. The most successful are those that best manage the constant tensions between resources and opportunities, each of which run the gamut from purely local to worldwide. He offers a framework that defines the choices a venture has at its inception and throughout its life, then shows how the framework can be used to assess and direct a venture and mitigate developing tensions by anticipating a variety of strategic, financial, organizational and regulatory factors. This is illustrated with case examples of a software company that took a balanced or “diagonal” path (the most common), an air-freight delivery service that progressed from pursuing local opportunities with local resources to pursuing cross-border opportunities with local resources, and a consumer-loan provider that began by pursuing a local opportunity with local resources, then added cross-border resources. Other examples include London-based fashion e-tailer Boo.com, Boston-based Internet Securities Inc. and the Georgian Glass and Mineral Water Co. in the Republic of Georgia.

In recent years, gray markets -- in which a firm's products are sold or resold through unauthorized dealers -- have become ubiquitous. They exist for tangible products (lumber and electronic components) and intangibles (broadcast signals, IPOs); for massive goods (automobiles and heavy construction equipment) and for light, easily shipped products (watches and cosmetics); for the mundane (health and beauty aids) and the life saving (prescription drugs). Gray markets aren't going away soon. Although they ebb and flow as exchange rates, price differentials and supply conditions change, surveys confirm the increasing incidence and scope of gray markets. In many situations, their sales outstrip authorized sales. An inability to compete with gray markets can wreak havoc on firms and industries. Unfortunately, because it is so hard to get data on gray-market activity and what firms are doing to deal with it, there is little published guidance to help managers. The sale of legitimate products in the wrong place or in the wrong channel poses unique problems to companies, but there are unique solutions that can successfully manage them. Describing several examples that show the scope and complexity of the gray-market problem, the authors explain how managers can apply a framework based on sensing, speed and severity in order to manage it. They also point out scenarios in which gray markets actually help and should be tolerated.

Although the pursuit of opportunity promises outsized rewards to entrepreneurs and established enterprises, it also entails great uncertainty. The critical task of entrepreneurship lies in effectively managing the uncertainty inherent in trying something new. Some entrepreneurs foolishly try to ignore uncertainty; others go to the opposite extreme of attempting to avoid it altogether. Rather than ignore uncertainty or attempt to avoid it in the na_ve belief that every contingency can be anticipated, entrepreneurs should instead manage uncertainty by taking a disciplined approach. Over the past five years, the author conducted systematic research into how entrepreneurs manage the inevitable risks while pursuing opportunities. A synthesis of the research revealed that discipline -- and its byproduct, the successful management of uncertainty -- comes through the adoption of an iterative experimentation model. In this three-step process, an entrepreneur first formulates a working hypothesis about an opportunity, then assembles the resources to test the hypothesis, and finally designs and runs real-world experiments. Depending on the results of a round of experimentation, the entrepreneur may revise the hypothesis and run another experiment, harvest the value created through a sale, or abandon the hypothesis and pull the plug. The model provides insights into some of the most daunting questions entrepreneurs face -- including how to screen an opportunity, how much money to raise, when to make key hires and how to use limited resources most efficiently.

Many studies have shown that the most treacherous time in the failure-strewn business of mergers comes when companies attempt to combine operations. Surprisingly, however, they often destroy value not as a result of inattention to detail but through excessive zeal in their integration efforts. That's because acquirers, recognizing the many potential dangers inherent in the merger process, often attempt to immunize themselves by painstakingly mapping out comprehensive, detailed plans for blending every aspect of operations. What they don't realize is that too much integration can block companies from realizing the benefits of a merger just as easily as too little can. And, in some cases, overintegrating can do far more damage. The authors posit that M&;A activity is typically based on one of three types of "investment theses"-- "active investing," growing scope and growing scale -- and that each requires different degrees of merger integration. If an acquired company is the first plank of a new platform in a venture-capitalist firm's portfolio, for example, it will probably require the bare minimum of integration. But deals that enhance scope or scale require executives to pay much more attention to integration. The authors explain how Illinois Tool Works, Sears, Roebuck and Co., BP, Philips Medical Systems and Keppel Offshore & ; Marine have all benefited from integrating selectively, comprehensively or with a mix of the two, according to whether they were seeking economies of scale or scope.

Technological diversity and organizational structure both shape an alliance’s potential payoff.

Truly innovative strategy must emanate from more than objective analysis.

Differences in emphasis and approach make global supply-chain management even more of a challenge.

Although large-scale risks such as war, terrorism and natural disaster garner media attention, it is the everyday, small-scale risks associated with opacity -- a lack of transparency in countries' legal, economic, regulatory and governance structures -- that can confound global investment and commerce. The authors offer new research that identifies the causes and measures the effects of this phenomenon across 48 countries. The research draws upon 65 objective variables from 41 sources including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Securities Services Association, the "International Country Risk Guide" and individual country's regulators. The authors' methodology projects which aspects of a country's economy carry the greatest risk, then, by assessing and comparing the costs of those risks on a country-by-country basis, they create an overall Opacity Index. Next they correlate the Opacity Index to a variety of other indicators, including a country's income level, economic development and foreign investment, entrepreneurship, and access to capital and lending and equity markets. The authors conclude that opacity strongly correlates overall with slower growth and less foreign direct investment in nearly all markets, and they suggest how information about opacity and its contributing factors can enhance both managerial and national policy decisions alike.

Food giant Kellogg Co. struggled throughout the 1990s, as both the stature of its legendary brands and its profit margins declined. A noted business journalist describes how the appointment of Carlos Gutierrez as CEO and the loss of market leadership to General Mills Inc. in 1999 forced Kellogg to establish a more meaningful, sustainable profit-oriented focus in recent years and outlines Kellogg's ambitious program of change. New business models emphasized value (rather than volume) growth and encouraged stronger cash flow. Realism was restored to financial forecasts, brand unit operations more closely integrated and employee compensation tied directly to business unit performance. New product launch documents stopped evaluating margins by volume alone, and innovation specialists were encouraged to add value-added touches to existing brands. As a result of this change in strategy, says the author, Kellogg's fortunes have improved dramatically. New product launches based on existing products have done well. And the company is better able to access its healthy food roots by playing up the health benefits of key products. Most importantly, says the author, a return to strong profitable growth and increasing market confidence in the company serves as further evidence of the strategy's success.

Every industry leader lives in fear of the low-end competitor -- a company offering much lower prices for a seemingly similar product. The vast majority of such low-end companies fall into one of four types: strippers, predators, reformers and transformers. Each of those is defined by the functionality of product and the convenience of purchase. Strippers, for instance, typically enter a market with a bare-bones offering, reduced in function and usually in convenience. Industry leaders have significant advantages for combating low-end competition, but they often hesitate because they're afraid their actions will adversely affect their current profit margins. The answer, then, is to find the response that is most likely to restore market calm in the least disruptive way. An industry leader could choose to ride out the challenge by ignoring, blocking or acquiring the low-end competitor. Or it could decide to strengthen its own value proposition by adding new price points, increasing its level of benefits or dropping its prices. Such tactics can be effective in the short term, but the industry leader also needs to consider strategic retreat, particularly when certain conditions make future low-end challenges inevitable.