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To measure brand health -- and, contrary to conventional wisdom, the authors contend, it can be measured -- is to obtain a 360-degree view of a brand in its marketplace, a wide-angle view of consumers and competitors. What is required, they say, is isolating underlying elements that matter, measuring them and linking them to business performance. Based upon quantitative survey data collected in 2007 from consumers in large sectors of the U.S. economy -- food and grocery, wireless services and banking -- drawn from major geographic markets nationwide, the authors offer a statistically reliable set of brand-health elements for companies to measure and to use as leading indicators of sales risk and potential: brand leadership, attractiveness, distinctiveness, satisfaction and liabilities. They then map those elements to four revenue-related expressions of customer commitment: current customer spending, risk of sales loss, revenue momentum and likelihood of referrals. The resulting framework allows marketers and investors to "connect the dots" between key elements of brand health and business performance and to reconcile previously separate notions: brand and operations, the short term and the long term, investment and return. In the research, the number of companies consumers named as having strong brands was surprisingly small. Fifteen companies accounted for fully 50% of the mentions and only three companies -- Apple, Coca-Cola and Microsoft -- accounted for 25% of mentions. The authors conclude with a set of best practices that are implied by the brand-health framework and also characterize companies that are perceived as having the strongest brands.

Companies have four ways of building businesses from within their organizations. Each approach provides certain benefits — and raises specific challenges.

For executives running global companies, the challenge of keeping abreast of events in markets around the world is mind-boggling. The problem is not a lack of information -- it is having the time and energy to process the information. How should executives prioritize their time to ensure that it is focused on the countries and subsidiaries that need the attention? Which markets should they emphasize, and which ones can they allow to fall off their radar screen? The authors researched executive attention at global companies for five years, interviewing 50 executives at 30 corporations including ABB, Dun & Bradstreet, Nestl_ and Sara Lee. They found that executives end up prioritizing a handful of markets at the expense of the others, but they don't always select the most promising ones. Because executive attention is so limited, executives tend to focus on the home market or on "hot" markets, always at the expense of other opportunities. The authors examine the nature of executive attention and identify mechanisms by which subsidiary companies attract attention from the top executives. Although attention can be harmful as well as helpful, the article focuses on the positive aspects. In particular, the authors focus on three elements: support, in terms of how headquarters executives interact with and help subsidiary managers achieve their goals; visibility, in terms of the public statements headquarters executives make about how the subsidiary is doing; and relative standing, in terms of the subsidiary's perceived status vis-_-vis other subsidiaries in the organization.

Some successful innovations, such as the microwave oven and the dishwasher, were initially slow to achieve consumer acceptance. When consumers resist adopting an innovation because it requires them to alter established habits, the innovation is called a resistant innovation. The authors use a case study involving the diffusion of screwcap wine closures in three countries -- Australia, New Zealand and the United States -- to analyze strategies for marketing a resistant innovation. For winemakers, screwcap closures represent a solution to "cork taint," a quality problem that can be caused by poor-quality corks and that can affect wine flavor. But consumers have shown resistance to screwcap closures, associating them with cheap wines or preferring the tradition associated with cork. However, among wine consumers in Australia and New Zealand, screwcaps have now achieved widespread acceptance. But 2005 wine industry statistics showed that less than 5% of U.S. wineries used screwcaps on fine wines. What is the reason for this difference? Earlier research in 2004 had found few differences between U.S. wine consumers and those in Australia and New Zealand -- except in their attitudes toward screwcaps. Garcia, Bardhi and Friedrich interviewed decision makers at more than two dozen wineries in the three countries. The authors concluded that winemakers in Australia and New Zealand had generally taken a different approach to marketing screwcap wine closures than United States wineries did. United States winemakers tended to employ vertical cooperation strategies that involved working with distribution channels to market screwcaps. New Zealand and Australian winemakers, on the other hand, used coopetition strategies involving cooperation among wineries, such as a New Zealand wine industry group called the New Zealand Wine Seal Initiative. The authors conclude that, under certain circumstances, coopetition strategies, which involve some cooperation among competitive firms, can be an effective strategy for marketing a resistant innovation. To determine whether or not coopetition is an appropriate strategy, the authors suggest that managers should analyze the marketing problem the new innovation faces and the resources available to address it; consider the kind of specific resources and knowledge that might be exchanged during coopetition; and evaluate the industry climate, including the role of trade associations and industry experts.

Business schools and others interested in management education and development have vigorously debated how best to teach strategy to future leaders. Some experts have questioned whether the topic should be taught at all -- or at least whether it should be taught to managers. Often missing from the debate, however, has been any in-depth discussion of how individuals learn to think strategically in the first place. What specific experiences are important and how do they contribute? Moreover, what are the different ways in which people absorb those experiences to develop the ability to think strategically? To answer these and other questions, the author conducted a study that identified executives who were considered the top strategic thinkers in their industry. The study then investigated the totality of experiences (educational, job related or other) that contributed to the high ability of those individuals. In addition, the research investigated the different ways in which the executives acquired their expertise in strategic thinking -- a process that typically took more than a decade The data showed that strategic thinking arises from 10 specific types of experiences -- for instance, spearheading a major growth initiative or dealing with a threat to organizational survival. Moreover, executives appear to gain their expertise in strategic thinking through one of three developmental patterns. These findings help demystify the process by which strategic thinking is learned, offering important implications for management development and the practice of strategy.

Managing returns, structuring the physical distribution network and deploying product inventories are all key.

Although the Internet has become an indispensable tool for 21st-century organizations, a 2005 report of the President's Information Technology Advisory Committee bluntly states that the information technology infrastructure of the United States is highly vulnerable to terrorist or criminal attacks. In a brief overview of this sobering situation, MIT applied mathematics professor and Akamai Technologies chief scientist Tom Leighton, who served on PITAC and chaired its cyber-security subcommittee, describes two of today's big Internet security threats: denial of service attacks and "pharming" -- both of which could be used to disable individual companies or critical infrastructure, such as the nation's utilities. At the present time, little is being done to fix these problems, says Leighton, though the advisory committee recommended that the U.S. government lead the way by funding long-term, fundamental research on cyber-security issues. Doing so, would promote wider adoption of improved Internet protocols, and that, he says, would lead to a more secure, reliable Internet infrastructure.

Today, as consumer choices on one side of the planet affect living conditions for people on the other side and complex supply chains span the globe, businesses are facing a host of “sustainability” problems & #8212; social and ecological imbalances created by this globalization. Beginning in the late 1990s, organizational members of the Society for Organizational Learning (including Shell, Harley-Davidson, HP, Xerox and Nike, among others) began a variety of initiatives focusing on collaborative solutions to a variety of sustainability issues. The group’s goals have included the application of systems thinking, working with mental models, and fostering personal and shared vision to face these complex sustainability issues. Through its work, SoL (of which two of the authors are founding members) has learned that successful collaborative efforts embrace three interconnected types of work & #8212; conceptual, relational and action-driven & #8212; which together build a healthy “learning ecology” for systemic change. In this article, the authors offer examples from particular projects in which this learning ecology provided an important foundation for substantive progress, and they draw lessons for companies and managers regarding each of the three types of work. Ultimately, the authors conclude that conceptual, relational and action-driven work must be systemically interwoven and that there is little real precedent for that. They offer several guidelines for how it can be accomplished, emphasizing leadership and transactional networks. Finally, they pose three questions that must be answered if systemic solutions are to be successful: (1) How can we get beyond benchmarking to building learning communities? (2) What is the right balance between specifying goals and creating space for reflection and innovation? (3) What is the right balance between private interest and public knowledge?

For several years now, marketers have been urged to embrace one-to-one marketing and to offer microsegmented consumers customized products and services through targeted outreach. While the "market of one" approach can pay off, says the author, it requires a significant upfront investment, including: implementing customer relationship management software applications; filtering, enhancing and cleaning customer data; and personalizing interactions (e-mail, billing, offers and so on). These activities take time and coordination of multiple parts of the organization (marketing, customer service, sales, information technology), which can be daunting for companies trying to react quickly to a changing environment. In addition, those systems have often produced disappointing results because their use was not well integrated with corporate strategy. Also, micro-marketing strategy, on its own, is too narrow. Companies still need to reach broad groups of people with messages that are not dependent on an individual's decision to open an envelope (whether virtual or physical), pick up the phone or click on a box. But broad-based, broadcast media is ineffective and expensive. Fortunately, there are alternative solutions, such as one-to-one targeting and the broadcasting of 30-second television spots. The author's research on trends in marketing spending and consumer attitudes about advertising reveals four strategies available to companies that want to reach broad groups of people without breaking their marketing budget. The strategies are liberally illustrated with examples of Nike, Microsoft, UBS, Delta, Sony, Procter & Gamble, Citibank, Nextel, Honda, Nokia and McDonald's, among others.

Launching new ventures outside a corporation's core business is risky and failure-prone -- yet often perceived as vital to innovation and organic growth. Can investing in new ventures add value to a company despite the risks? To explore that question, the authors conducted an in-depth study of corporate venturing at Nokia Corp. between 1998 and 2002; the study included two years of dissertation research by one of the authors. The research yielded a number of lessons about corporate venturing. For example, Nokia discovered that looking at the success or failure of an individual project as a business was the wrong way to evaluate the effectiveness of the venturing program. Whether or not they succeeded as businesses, Nokia's corporate ventures often added important capabilities to the core business, such as familiarity with a new customer segment for the company. In fact, seemingly unrelated investments sometimes led to technologies that later benefited the company's core business. The authors conclude that, to extract value from corporate ventures, companies must use different management practices than in their established businesses, structure new ventures so that they don't face pressure to deliver immediate results, and emphasize learning. Although 70% of Nokia's corporate venturing investments during the period studied were either discontinued or completely divested, the capabilities and technologies developed nonetheless played an important role in helping the company's core businesses respond to change.