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How do managers at firms that compete primarily in local markets stay abreast of broader industry trends and innovations? In this article, the authors highlight an interesting way in which managers at some smaller regional firms in the United States seek to combat forces of inertia and myopia in their businesses: by networking with managers of noncompeting firms that operate in the same industry but in other geographic regions. The authors call these networks “industry peer networks” (IPNs) and have conducted research into how common such networks are and how they function. In the United States, industry peer networks apparently originated in the auto-retailing industry in 1947, when an owner of several auto dealerships began bringing managers from those dealerships together to exchange ideas. The concept spread both geographically and into a number of other industries, and industry peer networks now exist in businesses ranging from advertising agencies to office furniture distributors. A typical industry peer network consists of a number of small groups, each containing no more than 20 managers from noncompeting companies. These groups usually have face-to-face meetings two to four times a year to discuss management issues; they often share confidential financial data with each other as well.

Companies should evaluate an outsourced process on several dimensions and then tailor the contract accordingly.

Every sales cycle has some degree of inherent volatility. A big customer could, for instance, go bankrupt or a major deal could fall through. But there's one type of volatility that many executives seem to think is a kind of natural law: At the beginning of every quarter, sales tend to falter; at the end, they often surge. This roller coaster can be a huge problem when major deals fail to materialize at the end of the quarter, leaving a shortfall. According to the author, such kinks in the sales cycles can be smoothed out, but doing so requires a fundamental change in how sales activities are prioritized. The typical sales process is like a funnel: At the bottom are the deals that are nearest to being closed; in the middle are other prospects in the works; and above are numerous promising leads. Companies typically work their funnels from the bottom up. After all, why not concentrate on the surest opportunities first and leave the less certain ones for last? But that prioritization strategy is the fundamental cause of the sales roller coaster. The author of this article argues that for a more continuous -- and predictable -- revenue stream, firms should prioritize the three areas of the funnel in the following way: bottom, above and then middle.

Achieving a state of clarity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for making good decisions.

Traditionally, when managers have been considering whether to file a lawsuit, their attorneys have advised them on factors such as the likely costs of a suit and the probability of obtaining damages. However, the authors note, companies today may want to consider an additional factor: the possible marketing consequences -- positive or negative -- of a given lawsuit. In particular, the authors discuss the marketing implications of lawsuits between competitors or potential competitors. They consider the marketing ramifications of a lawsuit between two rival pizza chains, Pizza Hut Inc. and Papa John's International, over advertising claims made by Papa John's -- and conclude that publicity surrounding an initial verdict in Pizza Hut's favor (a verdict later overturned) generally conveyed Pizza Hut's perspective to the public, presumably with more credibility than similar advertising would have. The authors also examine a trademark dispute between Starbucks Corp. and the owner of the Old Quarter Acoustic Caf_, a bar in Galveston, Texas, which markets "Starbock" beer. In this case, they observe that Starbucks faced the marketing risk of appearing to be a bully. The authors also explore how large corporations in suits with smaller rivals may face a risk of negative publicity, while small companies may face financial risks.

Whether a manufacturer's direct sales via the Internet help or hurt its retail partners depends upon the pricing strategy it employs.

Many companies leave risk management and business continuity to security professionals, business continuity planners or insurance professionals. However, the authors argue, building a resilient enterprise should be a strategic initiative that changes the way a company operates and increases its competitiveness. Reducing vulnerability means both reducing the likelihood of a disruption and increasing resilience. Resilience, in turn, can be achieved by either creating redundancy or increasing flexibility. Redundancy is the familiar concept of keeping some resources in reserve to be used in case of a disruption. The most common forms of redundancy are safety stock, the deliberate use of multiple suppliers even when the secondary suppliers have higher costs, and deliberately low capacity utilization rates. Although necessary to some degree, redundancy represents pure cost with no return except in the eventuality of disruption. The authors contend that significantly more leverage, not to mention operational advantages, can be achieved by making supply chains flexible. Flexibility requires building in organic capabilities that can sense threats and respond to them quickly. Drawing on ongoing research at the MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics involving detailed studies of dozens of cases of corporate disruption and response, the authors describe how resilient companies build flexibility into each of five essential supply chain elements: the supplier, conversion process, distribution channels, control systems and underlying corporate culture. Case examples of Land Rover, Aisin Seiki Co. (a supplier to Toyota), United Parcel Service, Dell, Baxter International, DHL and Nokia, among others, are offered to illustrate how building flexibility in these supply chain elements not only bolsters the resilience of an organization but also creates a competitive advantage in the marketplace.

Global sourcing is an advanced but complex approach to sourcing and supply management. The authors use survey research to gauge the extent to which companies are currently practicing global sourcing, which involves integrating and coordinating common items, materials, processes, technologies, designs and suppliers across worldwide buying, design and operating locations. In a sample consisting of supply executives primarily from large North American-based multinationals -- particularly manufacturers, the majority of survey respondents said their companies practice some form of international purchasing, a less integrated and coordinated approach than global sourcing. However, more than 70% of managers surveyed said that their companies plan to use global sourcing in the future. The authors identify a set of features common among companies that excel at global sourcing. The features cluster into seven broad characteristics: executive commitment to global sourcing; rigorous and well-defined global sourcing processes; availability of resources needed for the global sourcing initiative, including access to qualified personnel and budgets; information technology systems that support data analysis on a worldwide level; organizational design features that support the initiative, such as an executive committee that oversees global sourcing; structured approaches to communication, such as regular strategy review sessions; and methodologies for measuring savings from global sourcing.

For boards dealing with an embattled CEO, doing nothing may pay off in the long run.

By analyzing 50 cases of successful sustainable enterprise in developing countries, the authors developed a conceptual framework they call the Sustainable Local Enterprise Network model. Analysis of the 50 cases revealed that examples of successful sustainable enterprise in developing countries often involve informal networks that include businesses, not-for-profit organizations, local communities and other actors. These networks can lead to virtuous cycles of reinvestment in an area's financial, social, human and ecological capital. Successful SLENs, the authors found, require at least one business enterprise to ensure the network's financial sustainability and serve as its anchor; however, that anchor role may be played by a cooperative or a profitable social enterprise launched by a non-governmental organization. While multinational corporations were sometimes part of the SLENs studied, entrepreneurs, nonprofits and sustainable local businesses were more common. Using a number of examples from their research, the authors describe how SLENs operate. Examples include networks involving Honey Care Africa Ltd., a honey company based in Nairobi, Kenya, which aims to promote rural development through beekeeping, and Grameen Shakti, which sells solar energy systems for homes in Bangladesh. The authors conclude with recommendations for fostering the development of SLENs, such as setting up training programs in sustainable entrepreneurship in developing countries.