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Determining which business activities to bring inside a firm and which to outsource is a critical strategic decision. Firms that bring in the wrong business activities risk losing strategic focus; those that fail to bring the right business activities within their boundaries risk losing their competitive advantage. A well-developed approach for determining a firm's boundary, called transactions cost economics, specifies the conditions for managing a particular economic exchange within an organizational boundary and the conditions for choosing outsourcing. A popular version of transactions cost economics requires managers to consider a single characteristic of an economic exchange -- its level of transaction-specific investment. Three concepts aid in understanding transactions cost economics as applied to firm boundary decisions: governance (the mechanism through which a firm manages an economic exchange), opportunism (taking unfair advantage of other parties to an exchange), and transaction-specific investment (any investment that is significantly more valuable in one particular exchange than in any alternative exchange). Firms can use governance mechanisms to mitigate the threat of opportunism. Traditional transactions cost economics does not focus on the capabilities of a firm or its potential partners, even though economic exchanges involve (1) cooperating with firms that possess critical capabilities, (2) developing capabilities independently, or (3) acquiring another firm that already possesses needed capabilities. The author describes the conditions under which a firm's decisions on managing its business activities should be affected by its capabilities and those of its partners. When these conditions hold -- conditions particularly common in rapidly evolving high-technology industries -- firms should make boundary decisions that differ significantly from what would be suggested by traditional transactions cost analysis.

Viewing the evolution of strategic management as ten "schools" of practice, Mintzberg and Lampel explore whether these perspectives represent fundamentally different processes of strategy making or different parts of the same process. Unwilling to be constrained by either definition, the authors point out that some schools clearly are stages or aspects of the strategy formation process. Under certain circumstances, such as during start-up or under dynamic conditions when prediction seems impossible, the process may tilt toward the attributes of one school or another. Thus, identifiable stages and periods exist in making strategy -- not in any absolute sense, but as recognizable tendencies. Despite this, the inclination has been to favor the interpretation that the schools represent fundamentally different processes. In cautioning against adopting a pseudoscientific theory of change in strategy formation, Mintzberg and Lampel note with optimism that recent approaches to strategy formation cut across the various schools of practice in eclectic ways. Some of the greatest failings of strategic management, they say, occur when managers take one point of view too seriously. Ideas and practices that originate from collaborative contacts between organizations, from competition and confrontation, from recasting of the old, and from the sheer creativity of managers are driving the evolution of strategic management today. Mintzberg and Lampel advise scholars and consultants to get beyond the narrowness of the ten schools to learn how strategy formation -- which combines all ten schools and more -- really works. The goal is better practice, not neater theory.

Strategy development requires that managers predict the future in an inherently uncertain world. Many mistakenly do so on the basis of perceived historical patterns that, according to recent scientific understanding of complex systems, do not have great predictive value. Complex systems consisting of many dynamically interacting parts are difficult and often impossible to predict because they exhibit punctuated equilibrium (periods of relative quiescence interspersed with episodes of dramatic change) and path dependence (small, random changes at one point in time that lead to radically different outcomes later). What, then, is a strategist to do? Beinhocker recommends cultivating and managing populations of multiple strategies that evolve over time, because the forces of evolution acting on a population of strategies make them more robust and adaptive. Because both biological evolution and business evolution are complex adaptive systems, to better understand business strategy, managers can employ a tool that scientists use to better understand biological evolution. An imaginary grid called a fitness landscape is an aid to comprehending how evolution increases the odds of survival in nature. In general, the rules for success in fitness landscapes also apply to business problems, though their specific application differs significantly by company and situation. The lessons of fitness landscapes offer an untraditional picture of what a company needs to develop a successful strategy. Because shifting an organization to this way of thinking about strategy is not easy, a company can take six actions to reinforce the robust, adaptive mind-set: -- Invest in a diversity of strategies. -- Evaluate strategies as real options that may open future possibilities, and remove biases that undervalue experimentation and flexibility. -- Diversify strategies along three dimensions -- time frame, risk, and relatedness to current business. -- Ensure that the strategies include sufficiently diverse initiatives in promising areas. -- Check that selection pressures on the firm's population of strategies reflect those operating on the population of strategies in the marketplace. -- Use venture capital performance metrics.

Whereas companies once focused primarily on outplaying competitors at a fixed game, now their central focus is on understanding the relationship between an environment's turbulence and their choice of strategy. By doing so, managers can develop better strategies that lead to and maintain strategic supremacy. This process begins with analysis of a firm's current competitive environment, followed by an understanding of the rules of the game in that industry. If a firm lacks the capabilities to succeed in the environment or wishes to challenge the status quo to improve its position, it might consider changing the rules. The ability to establish the rules of the game to control evolution is one facet of strategic supremacy. The player with strategic supremacy shapes the field and basis of competition for its rivals. Studies of hypercompetitive environments provide insight into the inextricably intertwined relationships among disruption, patterns of turbulence, the rules of competition, and definition of the playing field. Why is changing the environment important? Some strategies may work well in one environment but not in another. For example, strategies that are successful in fairly stable environments may be a liability in unstable ones. Whereas profits previously depended on stability and lack of rivalry, profits in hypercompetitive environments like those of the 1990s result from increased rivalry that focuses on defining a new basis of competition for customers. Extending the insights gained from hypercompetitive markets, D'Aveni suggests that turbulence creates competitive environments characterized by distinct patterns of disruption determined by frequency and their competence-destroying or competence-enhancing nature. The four competitive environments (equilibrium, fluctuating equilibrium, punctuated equilibrium, and disequilibrium) require different strategies. The goal of incumbent leaders and challengers in each environment is to achieve strategic supremacy by controlling the degree and pattern of turbulence. But, because rivals and customers are never content with the status quo, the battle for strategic supremacy is continuous.

Traditional strategic planning draws from forecasts of parameters like market growth, prices, exchange rates, and input costs that managers are unable to predict five or ten years in advance with any accuracy. Nevertheless, some firms meticulously construct strategic plans on the basis of forecasting that, in all probability, will be wrong. These companies tend to overinvest in building assets and capabilities that are highly specific to a particular strategy, relative to what would be optimal if planning explicitly acknowledged that forecasts would likely be off the mark. While companies may focus on executing a single strategy at any particular time, they must also build and maintain a portfolio of strategic options on the future. They must invest in developing new capabilities and learning about new, potential markets. By establishing a set of strategic options, a company can reposition itself faster than competitors that have focused on "doing more of the same." Williamson discusses a strategy that embodies a coherent portfolio of options, sketches a process managers can use to develop this kind of strategy, and explains how planning and management opportunism can reinforce each other. Creating a portfolio of future options involves: -- Uncovering the hidden constraints on a company's future -- both capability constraints and market-knowledge constraints. -- Establishing processes to minimize the costs of building and maintaining the portfolio. -- Optimizing the portfolio by considering (1) alternative capabilities that could profitably meet customer needs and (2) future markets or new customer behaviors. -- Combining planning and opportunism, both of which are essential to the proactive creation of strategic options. Williamson cautions that a company must keep tactical opportunism within the bounds of its overall direction, ruling out options that might cause it to deviate from its long-term mission. Short-term opportunism must determine which precise option a company chooses to exercise.

In rapidly changing markets, decisions that changeåÊa company's direction arise much more often.

Managers typically assess what competitors do and strive to do it better. Using this approach, companies expend tremendous effort and achieve only incremental improvement -- imitation, not innovation. By focusing on the competition, companies tend to be reactive, and their understanding of emerging mass markets and changing customer demands becomes hazy. During the past decade, Kim and Mauborgne have studied companies of sustained high growth and profits. All pursue a strategy, value innovation, that renders the competition irrelevant by offering new and superior buyer value in existing markets or by enabling the creation of new markets through quantum leaps in buyer value. Value innovation places equal emphasis on value and innovation, since innovation without value can be too strategic or wild, too technology-driven or futuristic. Hence, value innovation is not the same as value creation. Although value creation on an incremental scale creates some value, it is not sufficient for high performance. To value innovate, managers must ask two questions: "Is the firm offering customers radically superior value?" and "Is the firm's price level accessible to the mass of buyers in the target market?" A consequence of market insight gained from creative strategic thinking, value innovation focuses on redefining problems to shift the performance criteria that matter to customers. Kim and Mauborgne ask five key questions contrasting conventional competition-based logic with that of value innovation and describe the type of organization that best unlocks its employees' ideas and creativity. Rather than follow conventional practices for maximizing profits, successful value innovators use a different market approach that consists of (1) strategic pricing for demand creation and (2) target costing for profit creation. Value innovation as strategy creates a pattern of punctuated equilibrium, in which bursts of value innovation that reshape the industrial landscape are interspersed with periods of improvements, geographic and product-line extensions, and consolidation.

Every decade or two, a big idea in management thinking takes hold and becomes widely accepted. The next big idea must enable businesses to improve the hit rate of strategic initiatives and attain the level of renewal necessary for successful execution. Scientific research on complex adaptive systems has identified principles that apply to living things, from amoebae to organizations. Four principles in particular are relevant to new strategic work, as activities at Royal Dutch/Shell demonstrate: 1. Equilibrium equals death. The lure of equilibrium poses a constant danger to successful firms. In 1996, Shell was highly profitable, but fissures were forming below the surface. Downstream, Shell's oil products business faced grave competitive threats. Steve Miller, the business's group managing director and a student of complexity theory, recognized that to meet those threats, he would have to disturb equilibrium by bypassing the resistant bureaucracy and involving the front lines in renewal. By 1997, after a series of initiatives, Shell ranked first in share among major oil companies; by 1998, the business had made a contribution of more than $300 million to Shell's bottom line. 2. Complex adaptive systems exhibit the capacity of self-organization and emergent complexity. The living-systems approach focuses on the intelligence in the nodes. To tap the retailing potential of the forecourt of Shell's service stations, Miller drew on the insights of frontline troops. He assembled teams from operating companies around the world into "retailing boot camps," workshops for identifying and exploiting market opportunities. These generated many new ideas for beating the competition. 3. Complex adaptive systems move toward the edge of chaos when provoked by a complex task. Novelty emerges in the space between rigidity and randomness. At Shell, the coaching of country teams and the new project work that resulted led to a more direct, informal, and less hierarchical way of working. 4. One cannot direct a living system, only disturb it. Managers cannot assume that a particular input will produce a particular output. Miller has learned that "top-down strategies don't win ballgames. Experimentation, rapid learning, and seizing the momentum of success is the better approach." While leaders provide the vision and establish the context, solutions to ongoing challenges are generated by the people closest to the action.

Competitive discontinuities demand changes in how diversified multinational corporations create wealth. While executives agree that changes in the last decade are qualitatively different from those in the past, many fail to take action or they apply old solutions, such as cost cutting, to new problems. The challenge for companies is to move from the zone of comfort -- the familiar -- to the zone of opportunity -- the unfamiliar. Sources of discontinuity include more powerful, better informed consumers; the breakup of traditional channel structures; deregulation, privatization, and globalization; the convergence of traditional and new technologies; changing competitive boundaries; the evolution to new standards; shorter product life cycles; and the greater involvement of business in ecological and social issues. In this environment, managers must develop new capabilities. They need to think and act globally, regionally, and locally; adapt to a different pace and rhythm in all aspects of a firm's activities; integrate new technological knowledge with old and reconfigure that knowledge into new business opportunities; develop consensus-building skills; form alliances; and allocate resources under conditions of ambiguity. At the same time, they must ensure the profitability of current business. The obstacles to transformation are formidable. Many senior managers have little knowledge of, or experience with, alternate models of managing and responding to new customer expectations. They seek administrative clarity at the expense of strategic clarity and sometimes lack the stamina needed to sustain high performance. Transformation requires interrelated systemwide changes. The effort must be driven by a new concept of opportunity and involve the entire organization. The first step is to create a transformation agenda to mobilize the organization. Managers must then fight inertia, align the organization with the new direction, undertake projects that provide the basis for experimenting and learning, and evaluate failure and success. Innovations in how firms manage must precede innovations in how they compete and create wealth.

Innovation researchers and software experts have long advocated incremental approaches to technology implementation. Fichman and Moses offer a strategy for guiding the implementation of advanced software technologies based on the principle of results-driven incrementalism (RDI), or self-contained implementation sequences -- each of which achieves a specific business result. The authors present an explicit process model and describe their experiences using the RDI strategy at Herman Miller, a large manufacturer of office furniture systems, which implemented supply-chain planning and scheduling software at six sites on time and within budget. No longer only a tool to automate or speed up ways of working, advanced software enables fundamentally new policies and work organizations. As a result, implementing technological process innovations involves learning and adjustment costs, which may exceed the raw purchase cost of the technology itself. The RDI approach benefits firms by promoting organizational learning via multiple, short-horizon goals; maintaining implementation focus and momentum by providing recurring visible results; and negating the common tendency to overengineer technology solutions -- all of which speed the realization of business results and reduce the risk of implementation failure. Consultants using the RDI approach found that some managers do not understand the benefits of self-contained implementation sequences and may consider such a process marginally valuable or impossible to use in their contexts. The authors cite five reasons for resistance and discuss ways to overcome it. The three critical success factors of the RDI approach are technology divisibility, technology and methodology fit, and technology and organization fit. Determining the most effective delivery process for a particular software technology requires ongoing R&;D by someone. The authors advocate that technology vendors view effective implementation processes as crucial to success and worthy of their R&;D efforts.