Articles

Companies often focus on creating organizational processes and structures that allow them to learn quickly. But recent research shows that organizations must also effectively manage how they forget. The authors present a new construct for companies to determine how best to remember the knowledge they should and forget the knowledge they shouldn't. According to them, forgetting can be categorized along two dimensions. The first differentiates between accidental and intentional forgetting. The former is most often associated with the loss of valuable knowledge, which thus reduces a company's competitiveness. Intentional forgetting, on the other hand, can benefit an organization by helping to rid it of knowledge that has been producing dysfunctional outcomes. The other dimension highlights the difference between knowledge that is entrenched versus new. The two dimensions form a matrix that categorizes the four types of organizational forgetting: 1. memory decay, 2. failure to capture, 3. unlearning and 4. avoiding bad habits. Each form is associated with a distinct set of processes and contexts that result in a specific set of challenges. As such, each of the four processes must be managed differently.

Despite studies indicating the contrary, many academics and practitioners assert that the business cycle can’t be predicted and therefore can’t be managed. However, managers who draw upon forecasting models, closely follow leading economic indicators and manage their business cycle proactively are likely to emerge from tough economic times intact, says the author. To this end, the “master cyclist” project has evaluated companies’ market literacy, forecasting capabilities and use of macroeconomic strategy. From the evaluation, it developed a set of managerial principles, defining how a market-literate management team would approach short-run functional decisions regarding inventory, production, marketing and pricing as well as more strategic choices regarding capital expansion, acquisitions and divestitures. According to the author, explicitly cycle-savvy companies like Johnson & ; Johnson, Southwest Airlines, DuPont and Duke Power weathered rough economic times well, while companies like Cisco Systems, which rejected the use of macroeconomic forecasting, was caught during the recent recession with crippling levels of product and supply-chain inventories. It follows then, according to the author, that strategic, tactical and functional decisions are better informed by intelligent speculations about the business cycle. As economic-forecasting indicators and techniques continue to improve, so should our understanding of both the business cycle and the principles associated with effectively managing it.

A review of recent and seminal work linking pricing decisions with operational insights.

The conventional planning process does not work for strategic experiments that are truly bleeding edge. Nevertheless, many companies cling to what they know & #8212; planning that holds managers responsible for numbers. But that is not practical for entering completely new territory, when numbers are essentially pulled out of a hat and their underlying assumptions rarely revisited. A better approach to planning comes from researchers at Dartmouth College’s Tuck School of Business. It emphasizes learning instead of numbers, and it draws on in-depth studies of such companies as New York Times Digital, Thomson Corp., Corning and Analog Devices. Their approach, theory-focused planning, diverges from conventional planning in six critical ways. Companies that use it concentrate on a few critical unknowns instead of the usual horde of details in conventional plans; they focus on the theory underlining the predictions rather than the predictions themselves; they look for trends rather than numerical benchmarks; they review the plan often, in response to important new data, instead of annually; in that review, they consider the experiment over time instead of just for the current period; and they emphasize leading indicators rather than financials. Companies still hold managers of strategic experiments responsible for performance, but performance is gauged according to how quickly managers learn from new data. To be successful in uncharted waters, the ability to learn from experience is paramount.

Many corporate boards adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to governance. Instead, they should consider that their primary role must shift depending on various conditions, both internal and external. Boards have four main functions -- auditing, supervising, coaching and steering -- each with a different perspective and behavior. The roles reflect two main differences in board culture. The first type of board concerns itself mainly with shareholder interests or shareholder plus other stakeholder interests. The focus is on externalities. The second type of board either monitors executives' activities or gets actively involved in the conduct of the organization. Here the focus is on handling ineffective management. The basic role types are not mutually exclusive; instead they reflect different board cultures that result from different emphases on decision making and resource allocation. During any time period, a board must determine what its dominant role should be, given the current conditions.

For decades, companies relied on push marketing to sell their products and services. Then, in the 1990s, the emphasis shifted to relationship marketing, as slogans such as "delight your customers" became the mantra of many marketers. But those tactics have been losing their effectiveness, particularly as the power of customers continues to grow. Thanks to digital technologies like the Internet, today's increasingly educated consumers expect companies to do more than just delight them. In response, innovative companies are now trying a different approach: They are providing customers with open, honest and complete information, and then finding the best products for them -- even if those offerings are from competitors. In short, they are truly representing their customers' best interests, essentially becoming advocates for them. The strategy is this: If a company advocates for its customers, they will reciprocate with their trust, loyalty and purchases -- either now or in the future. The firm might then command higher prices for its products and services, as many customers will be willing to pay for the extra value. And when people trust a company, they will often tell others about it, helping to reduce the organization's costs for acquiring new customers.

Popular wisdom holds that blue-chip companies can somehow grow continuously. According to the authors, however, the struggle of corporate icons like Kodak, Digital and Xerox demonstrate that natural limitations, managerial complexity, a lack of stakeholder harmony and antitrust concerns make continuous growth increasingly difficult. Rather than seeking growth at any cost, they suggest that companies seek alternative ways of moving beyond natural growth limits. The authors draw on a host of examples -- from Microsoft, J.P. Morgan, IBM and others -- suggesting that companies finding themselves confronting this scenario can either break up their company, create new corporate forms or make a graceful growth-to-value transition. In evaluating their options, say the authors, the corporate executives must consider their company's position in its life cycle -- growth, stall or post-stall. Stalls can be anticipated by assessing the natural limits of the company's dominant growth strategy and its pattern of financial performance. Executives must also realistically assess their company's capacity for both innovation and new-business creation in order to decide whether their capital and talent would be better spent on core business development than on the reckless pursuit of high growth. Choosing alternate options is not easy, suggest the authors, given the pervasive culture of continuous growth. The first step toward making constructive decisions for a company's future, however, is to acknowledge that unbounded growth may indeed be a myth.

Sellers know things about their customers' businesses that the customers don't know and can't find out on their own yet value immensely. Because they come into contact with many and varied buyers, sellers have a bird's-eye view of the forest -- the industry's competitive landscape -- in contrast to customers, who often see only the trees. And they can use their wide range of experience to teach customers about their own businesses. This isn't a matter of divulging confidential aspects of clients' businesses to their competitors. The challenge is to translate an industrywide perspective into knowledge that customers can use. Companies that can do that successfully reduce their customers' costs or operating risks and are rewarded in turn with customer loyalty, pricing flexibility or both. The authors lay out three strategies that companies can adopt to turn a view of the forest into value for customers and competitive advantage for the business. They also explain the steps companies should take to collect, aggregate, adapt and share customer experiences.