Articles

Many companies keep their suppliers and partners at arm's length, zealously guarding internal knowledge. Toyota Motor Corp., however, embraces its suppliers and encourages knowledge sharing through established networks. Toyota has developed interorganizational processes that facilitate the transfer of both explicit and tacit knowledge. The three key processes revolve around supplier associations (for general sharing of information), consulting groups (for workshops, seminars and on-site assistance from Toyota) and learning teams (for on-site sharing of know-how within small groups). With Toyota's help, suppliers have fine-tuned their operations until, compared with their work for Toyota's rivals, they have 14% higher output per worker, 25% lower inventories and 50% fewer defects. Quality improvements enable Toyota to charge price premiums for its products. Toyota's experience suggests that competitive advantages can be created and sustained through superior knowledge-sharing processes within a supplier network. The authors believe those principles have applicability in other types of alliances, too, including joint ventures. In fact, they contend that establishing effective interorganizational knowledge-sharing processes with suppliers and partners can be crucial for any company. The authors claim that knowledge sharing with suppliers is the reason for Toyota's dynamic learning capability and might be the company's one truly sustainable competitive advantage.

In recent years, leaders at such high-profile companies as Xerox, Procter & ; Gamble, Lucent, Coca-Cola and Mattel have flamed out early in their tenures. Why did such promising and previously successful individuals fail so quickly in the CEO role? And why is such failure happening today with relatively high frequency? The individuals in charge bear some of the responsibility, of course. But the authors' research also uncovered other major forces at play. First is the impact of the predecessor CEO's actions on his or her successor's performance. While outgoing CEOs do not intend to contribute to the failure of their successors, their personal needs and actions can lay the groundwork for derailment. A second force is often the succession process itself. Once again, the outgoing CEO may be responsible, having failed to prepare a successor adequately; and the board is also often guilty of lack of oversight. A third reason for failure by new CEOs is their often narrow expertise and inability to set a proper context as a leader. The authors explore these issues and then offer advice to outgoing CEOs, directors and incoming leaders that may help them avoid the troubles that some companies have faced in making a leadership transition.

Charismatic and controversial former CEOs like General Electric Co.’s Jack Welch and Tyco’s Dennis Kozlowski are giving way to a new breed of leader dedicated to reviving the forward-thinking legacies of Old Economy titans, such as GE’s ingenious Thomas Edison and IBM’s visionary Tom Watson Jr. After years of focusing on the art of the deal, says the author, this renewed emphasis on innovation encourages corporate giants to again ground their organizations in what they do best. Many of today’s emergent corporate leaders, like MCI’s Michael Cappellas, IBM’s Sam Palmisano and GE’s Jeff Immelt, emulate the legendary standard bearers of invention by emphasizing technological engineering over financial engineering, product over marketing and real science over junk science. Critical to their leadership is an unrelenting drive for self-improvement, a strong interest in learning, an appreciation of a motivated work community and longer time frames than those dictated by a preoccupation with the daily stock price. For example, MCI is emerging from the years of WorldCom scandal by consciously drawing upon its legacy of telecommunications innovation. IBM actively seeks to again become the epitome of prestige, employee loyalty and innovation. GE creates a hothouse of R&;D while sharpening its innovative capability in the media and medical sectors through advantageous acquisitions. In addition, executives at 3M, DuPont and Pfizer, who increasingly emphasize research and innovation over promotion and hype, have helped their companies reassert their leadership roles in their respective fields.

Most management advice today -- whether it's from books or articles, prescribed in courses or by consultants -- says that change is good and more change is better. Advice on how to change varies quite a bit, but it has three features in common: "Creative destruction" is its motto. "Change or perish" is its justification. And "no pain, no change" is its rationale for overcoming a purportedly innate human resistance to change. The author admits that creative destruction may be necessary, and even preferable, in certain situations. Companies that have enjoyed captive markets, docile suppliers and government support may need the rude awakening it provides. In such instances, organizational stability is so ingrained that creative destruction may even be the best way to achieve change with the least amount of pain. But for every change avoider today, he says, there are many more "change-aholics" -- companies that have changed more aggressively, quickly and repeatedly than any organization could hope to do successfully. In the process, they have often suffered from "more pain, less change." The author urges executives at such companies to continually monitor their organizations for symptoms of repetitive change syndrome: initiative overload, change-related chaos, employee cynicism and burnout.

The value of external knowledge sharing increases when work groups are more structurally diverse.

Faced with saturation of their core product markets, companies in search of growth are increasingly turning to services. A few companies have enjoyed success with this approach; others have not been so fortunate. The authors explain how managers can improve the odds of success by taking a systematic approach to creating services-led growth. Companies must begin by redefining their markets in terms of customer activities and customer outcomes instead of products and services. Customers seek particular outcomes, and they engage in activities to achieve them. These activities can be mapped along a customer-activity chain, which is the foundation for exploring services-led growth opportunities. Analogous to product-centric growth strategies such as product-line extension, product-line filling and brand extensions, customer-activity chains can be extended, filled, expanded or reconfigured with new services. The authors have developed a framework -- the service-opportunity matrix -- to help managers structure the investigation of new opportunities. For each quadrant of the matrix, they provide a set of questions to help companies determine whether a particular approach would work for them. In addition, they have devised another matrix, on risk mitigation, to help managers assess the pitfalls and risks that these opportunities represent.

If retaining employees is the goal, the answer is yes — and no.

Several recent spectacular management failures call into doubt the ability of nontechnical managers to supervise the complex engineered systems for which they are increasingly responsible. However, the author of this article believes effective generalist managers in technical fields need to understand the risks faced and must sufficiently grasp the technology to effectively "talk the talk" with their staff and colleagues. To accomplish this, he contends that managers should focus relentlessly on key corporate priorities, continuously measuring employee performance to emphasize these crucial metrics. The author also recommends establishing official and unofficial pathways for collecting unfiltered and accurate information -- in particular, by developing a "back channel" of direct personal contact with one or two trusted technical staff with real insight into the unvarnished truth. In the end, the author contends, an insistence on facts rigorously applied, along with a cultivation of a "push back" culture that encourages people to raise concerns must underlie the commitments a technical organization makes. In this way, the author insists, a healthy organization can effectively handle both routine activities and serious crises regardless of who's in charge.

A robust economy isn’t as far out of reach as some may think.

Fear is a four-letter word in companies today, but CEOs” rhetoric of & ldquo;love”