Articles

Research has repeatedly demonstrated that managers contribute to a company's bottom line by enabling the emergence of work processes in constantly changing situations. But managers have received insufficient guidance about what exactly they should be doing to manage these emergent processes. The authors contend that managers must actively facilitate the confluence of participatory "spurts" of innovation. By examining the methods of companies such as Novell, IDS Scheer AG and Entergy, the authors identify four methods successful managers employ to address an emergent environment. First, these managers structure the work so that information, assumptions and interpretations are continually being challenged. Second, they accept that changing circumstance will continually require new knowledge and skill sets. Third, they understand that emergent processes involve unpredictable inputs from suppliers, employees, customers and other stakeholders. Lastly, they understand that they alone cannot induce participatory innovation, so they have learned to create or identify existing "reputation networks." Managers who have mastered these principles help their organizations to react so quickly to unpredictable events that the reactions often appear to have been planned and preemptive.

Although IT portfolio management has been a best practice for some time, many companies still generate substandard returns from their IT investments. The authors note that investing the right amounts in the right IT asset classes is only the first step -- IT portfolio management techniques must be complemented by a suite of interlocking business practices and processes collectively labeled "IT savvy." The benefits of establishing such practices add up to a tangible IT savvy premium: The authors point to higher net profits and other performance gains for IT-savvy companies in the year following their investments in key IT asset categories. The article cites a range of organizations -- from 7-Eleven Japan and Amazon.com to Raytheon and Carlson Companies -- in which IT savvy is ingrained, informing many of the companies' business decisions and sharply focusing their IT investments. Starting with a refresher on the IT portfolio approach -- and noting best-practices portfolio players such as UPS, Eli Lilly and Mohegan Sun -- the authors draw on the findings of a multiyear survey to review the different IT assets in which companies invest before discussing the gap in IT investment returns that separates those with IT savvy from those without. They present five hallmarks of IT savvy and offer a series of practical suggestions for how managers can start to match IT savvy with the IT asset mix.

Case studies suggest that companies including Avon, Stonyfield Farm and Starbucks have benefited from marketing initiatives associating the company with a socially beneficial cause. But how should managers allocate dollars between social-cause marketing and other types of marketing programs? The authors use a market-research technique called "conjoint analysis" to help managers evaluate the relative benefits of various types of affinity marketing programs, including sponsorship of social causes, sports or entertainment events. Conjoint analysis involves creating a variety of hypothetical brand profiles that contain combinations of brand attributes; by asking consumers to rank the profiles, researchers can gain insights into how different brand attributes affect consumers' preferences. In several experiments, the authors used conjoint analysis to examine how consumers' responses to a brand of beer, milk or juice would be affected if the brand had a marketing affiliation with a social cause or with a sport or entertainment event. For some of the products studied, affiliations with social causes had more positive effects on consumer rankings than affiliations with sports or entertainment events. However, this was not always true; for example, it was not the case for the milk brands studied, suggesting that the effect of social-cause marketing initiatives may vary by industry. The authors also discuss how brand managers can use conjoint analysis to compare potential marketing initiatives.

How do managers at firms that compete primarily in local markets stay abreast of broader industry trends and innovations? In this article, the authors highlight an interesting way in which managers at some smaller regional firms in the United States seek to combat forces of inertia and myopia in their businesses: by networking with managers of noncompeting firms that operate in the same industry but in other geographic regions. The authors call these networks “industry peer networks” (IPNs) and have conducted research into how common such networks are and how they function. In the United States, industry peer networks apparently originated in the auto-retailing industry in 1947, when an owner of several auto dealerships began bringing managers from those dealerships together to exchange ideas. The concept spread both geographically and into a number of other industries, and industry peer networks now exist in businesses ranging from advertising agencies to office furniture distributors. A typical industry peer network consists of a number of small groups, each containing no more than 20 managers from noncompeting companies. These groups usually have face-to-face meetings two to four times a year to discuss management issues; they often share confidential financial data with each other as well.

The frequent failure of strategy might lie in its very definition.

New products suffer from notoriously high failure rates. Many new products fail, not because of technical shortcomings, but because they simply have no market. Not surprisingly, then, studies have found that timely and reliable knowledge about customer preferences and requirements is the single most important area of information necessary for product development. To obtain such data, many organizations have made heavy -- but often unsuccessful -- investments in traditional market research. The authors provide an alternative. Companies including Threadless, Yamaha and Ryohin Keikaku have begun to integrate customers into the innovation process by soliciting new product concepts directly from them. These firms also ask for commitments from customers to purchase a new product before the companies commence final development and manufacturing. This process -- called "collective customer commitment"-- can help companies avoid costly product failures. In essence, collective customer commitment enables firms to serve a market segment efficiently without first having to identify that segment, and it helps convert expenditures in market research directly into sales.

Companies should evaluate an outsourced process on several dimensions and then tailor the contract accordingly.

Every sales cycle has some degree of inherent volatility. A big customer could, for instance, go bankrupt or a major deal could fall through. But there's one type of volatility that many executives seem to think is a kind of natural law: At the beginning of every quarter, sales tend to falter; at the end, they often surge. This roller coaster can be a huge problem when major deals fail to materialize at the end of the quarter, leaving a shortfall. According to the author, such kinks in the sales cycles can be smoothed out, but doing so requires a fundamental change in how sales activities are prioritized. The typical sales process is like a funnel: At the bottom are the deals that are nearest to being closed; in the middle are other prospects in the works; and above are numerous promising leads. Companies typically work their funnels from the bottom up. After all, why not concentrate on the surest opportunities first and leave the less certain ones for last? But that prioritization strategy is the fundamental cause of the sales roller coaster. The author of this article argues that for a more continuous -- and predictable -- revenue stream, firms should prioritize the three areas of the funnel in the following way: bottom, above and then middle.

Big strategic shifts are risky, but the constantly changing business environment periodically forces corporate leaders to reposition their businesses in fundamental ways. With case studies from the telecom equipment, auto, computer and beverage industries, the authors examine why some companies have been successful in making smart big moves while others have failed. Some of their findings were, by their own admission, predictable: for example, companies that initiated successful big moves exploited and in some instances enhanced their distinctiveness relative to their competitors. However, the authors identified a more surprising factor, which they refer to as "complementarity." The more successful companies followed a consistent learning logic both internally and externally, and they made big moves that were complementary over time. Complementarity plays out in three ways: (1) It builds on a successful business model; (2) it relies on periodic shifts in the balance between innovation, efficiency and customer intimacy when the business model is not working; and (3) it promotes a sequenced development of capabilities when the balance shifts.

Achieving a state of clarity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for making good decisions.