Articles

Five conversations — often avoided — are essential to the success of any high stakes project.

Dynamic pricing, in which prices respond to supply and demand pressures in real time or near-real time, has long been used by airlines and hotels. Now dynamic pricing is making inroads in many different sectors including apparel, automobiles, consumer electronics, personal services, telecommunications and second- hand goods. These companies are making use of new findings on dynamic pricing and of increases in data-processing power to raise their average realized prices, thereby increasing revenues and profits. There are two mechanisms for dynamic pricing: posted prices that customers can see; and price-discovery mechanisms, in which customers determine prices through their own actions. These two mechanisms are employed in seven different forms: yield management (commonly used by airlines), demandbased pricing, three types of auctions, group buying and negotiations. The article describes eight situations for using the various forms of dynamic pricing. An important constraint in employing dynamic pricing is consumers' Latitude of Price Acceptance, which varies for different products and situations and which can be discovered through observation, surveys or analysis of demand elasticities. Customer participation in the pricing process decreases the chances of a consumer backlash. Customers also tend to embrace dynamic pricing in the following situations: where the price reflects intensity of demand for the product, there is communication between the seller and the consumer, and the price difference is explained by a difference in perceived value across channels through which the transaction occurred. The more the seller understands the buying cycles and habits of the customer, the more he is able to manage price margins to the rhythm of the customer's shopping, to segment customers and to develop price discrimination.

The image of one omnipotent and charismatic CEO, alone at the top of the company, is closely held both in business theory and practice. But the authors argue that under the right conditions, co-chiefs -- two or even three individuals sharing the top job -- can benefit the organization because different leadership styles and competencies are simultaneously available to most effectively deal with differing situations. Notable examples past and present include Google, IMAX, Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs. From their study of over 100 companies that adopted power-sharing -- sometimes productively, sometimes not -- the authors conclude that it is most likely to work when the relationship between the co-CEOs evinces complementarity, compatibility and commitment. Further, careful design of the leaders' shared and separate responsibilities -- especially regarding communication mechanisms (for external constituents, inside the organization and between each other) -- is required. Lastly, it is essential that there be co-evolution, in which each of the co-leaders show willingness to change over time and allow their relationship to further develop. In that spirit, the authors offer seven practical "rules of engagement" for forming power-sharing structures with good potential for success, for ensuring smooth day-to-day functioning and for adjusting these relationships as conditions change.

The differences between veterans, boomers, Xers, Ys.

For executives running global companies, the challenge of keeping abreast of events in markets around the world is mind-boggling. The problem is not a lack of information -- it is having the time and energy to process the information. How should executives prioritize their time to ensure that it is focused on the countries and subsidiaries that need the attention? Which markets should they emphasize, and which ones can they allow to fall off their radar screen? The authors researched executive attention at global companies for five years, interviewing 50 executives at 30 corporations including ABB, Dun & Bradstreet, Nestl_ and Sara Lee. They found that executives end up prioritizing a handful of markets at the expense of the others, but they don't always select the most promising ones. Because executive attention is so limited, executives tend to focus on the home market or on "hot" markets, always at the expense of other opportunities. The authors examine the nature of executive attention and identify mechanisms by which subsidiary companies attract attention from the top executives. Although attention can be harmful as well as helpful, the article focuses on the positive aspects. In particular, the authors focus on three elements: support, in terms of how headquarters executives interact with and help subsidiary managers achieve their goals; visibility, in terms of the public statements headquarters executives make about how the subsidiary is doing; and relative standing, in terms of the subsidiary's perceived status vis-_-vis other subsidiaries in the organization.

Research shows that the most important factor for driving innovation is company culture.

Numerous studies confirm that few people can make it through a typical day without lying. So it should not be surprising that falsehoods and deception are widespread in business negotiations as well. The unspoken, and perhaps unconscious, thought is that if everyone lies, why is it so bad? The author examines legal and ethical views of lying, noting that while courts often hold parties to the truth of their representations, negotiators have many ways to mislead the opposing side. For example, negotiating tactics such as nondisclosure and evasion are rarely considered illegal. Indeed, it is often possible to avoid liability by using misleading behaviors that make no representations but which seem to. In light of the moral and legal ambiguity of lying, the author offers suggestions for how to detect lies and how to protect oneself against bargaining deception including: establishing negotiating ground rules before the discussions begin, asking the same question in different ways, asking questions to which you already know the answer, including written claims in the final agreement, using contingent agreements or using an escrow agent or a performance bond.

Some successful innovations, such as the microwave oven and the dishwasher, were initially slow to achieve consumer acceptance. When consumers resist adopting an innovation because it requires them to alter established habits, the innovation is called a resistant innovation. The authors use a case study involving the diffusion of screwcap wine closures in three countries -- Australia, New Zealand and the United States -- to analyze strategies for marketing a resistant innovation. For winemakers, screwcap closures represent a solution to "cork taint," a quality problem that can be caused by poor-quality corks and that can affect wine flavor. But consumers have shown resistance to screwcap closures, associating them with cheap wines or preferring the tradition associated with cork. However, among wine consumers in Australia and New Zealand, screwcaps have now achieved widespread acceptance. But 2005 wine industry statistics showed that less than 5% of U.S. wineries used screwcaps on fine wines. What is the reason for this difference? Earlier research in 2004 had found few differences between U.S. wine consumers and those in Australia and New Zealand -- except in their attitudes toward screwcaps. Garcia, Bardhi and Friedrich interviewed decision makers at more than two dozen wineries in the three countries. The authors concluded that winemakers in Australia and New Zealand had generally taken a different approach to marketing screwcap wine closures than United States wineries did. United States winemakers tended to employ vertical cooperation strategies that involved working with distribution channels to market screwcaps. New Zealand and Australian winemakers, on the other hand, used coopetition strategies involving cooperation among wineries, such as a New Zealand wine industry group called the New Zealand Wine Seal Initiative. The authors conclude that, under certain circumstances, coopetition strategies, which involve some cooperation among competitive firms, can be an effective strategy for marketing a resistant innovation. To determine whether or not coopetition is an appropriate strategy, the authors suggest that managers should analyze the marketing problem the new innovation faces and the resources available to address it; consider the kind of specific resources and knowledge that might be exchanged during coopetition; and evaluate the industry climate, including the role of trade associations and industry experts.

Managing intellectual property rights used to be straightforward. A company produced great innovations, obtained as many patents as possible and exploited those patents in the marketplace. But the intellectual property world has changed argue the authors. Today, leading companies are focusing on securing only the essential protections they need to exploit their innovations. Most businesses, though, continue to pursue the old "more is better" strategy. In effect, they're flying blind when it comes to managing their IP portfolio. The authors identify three key areas where leading companies drive profits and effectively manage their intellectual property. First, they have a strong market focus, which provides them a clear sense of the "freedom of action." Second, the leaders can articulate how they will derive value from each potential patent and ruthlessly prune patents that cannot generate an attractive overall return. Finally, top-tier organizations hire only the best talent to lead their IP efforts. Following this blueprint will allow companies to successfully manage a more complicated IP landscape.

Business schools and others interested in management education and development have vigorously debated how best to teach strategy to future leaders. Some experts have questioned whether the topic should be taught at all -- or at least whether it should be taught to managers. Often missing from the debate, however, has been any in-depth discussion of how individuals learn to think strategically in the first place. What specific experiences are important and how do they contribute? Moreover, what are the different ways in which people absorb those experiences to develop the ability to think strategically? To answer these and other questions, the author conducted a study that identified executives who were considered the top strategic thinkers in their industry. The study then investigated the totality of experiences (educational, job related or other) that contributed to the high ability of those individuals. In addition, the research investigated the different ways in which the executives acquired their expertise in strategic thinking -- a process that typically took more than a decade The data showed that strategic thinking arises from 10 specific types of experiences -- for instance, spearheading a major growth initiative or dealing with a threat to organizational survival. Moreover, executives appear to gain their expertise in strategic thinking through one of three developmental patterns. These findings help demystify the process by which strategic thinking is learned, offering important implications for management development and the practice of strategy.