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Lack of communication among colleagues in the workplace is a widespread problem. Many companies struggle with the "silo syndrome" -- employees from different departments tend to keep to themselves, leading to inefficiencies and missed opportunities, particularly those that would arise from chance encounters among people who don't, but should, know each other. The author asserts that two parallel paradigm shifts are helping to change that. The first is a movement from desktop to mobile computing. The second is the move from individual to "social" software, here defined as programs that enable a group of people to accomplish common goals. Together, they say, the two trends have the potential to dramatically transform the ways in which companies conduct business. Toward that end, the author and his colleagues have developed a new technology that could help facilitate greater workplace collaboration. The technology, known as "Serendipity," is a yet to be commercialized mobile-phone application, intended to extend (rather than supplant) existing enterprise-communication and knowledge-management systems by untethering them from the desktop so that they can be used in social situations where they might be most beneficial: near the water cooler, in the hallway, around the coffee machine. Serendipity relies on Bluetooth, a low-power radiofrequency protocol designed primarily to enable wireless headsets or laptops to connect to mobile phones. A byproduct of that functionality, however, is that Bluetooth devices are aware of one another, which essentially turns them into short-range beacons, each with its own unique ID. In this article, the author explains how Serendipity works and discusses a number of the potential business applications that could arise from its ability to study, track and, perhaps most importantly, predict the dynamics of a social network. He also discusses some of the privacy issues and necessary safeguards -- such as opt-in methodologies -- that would have to be associated with such applications.

Every industry leader lives in fear of the low-end competitor -- a company offering much lower prices for a seemingly similar product. The vast majority of such low-end companies fall into one of four types: strippers, predators, reformers and transformers. Each of those is defined by the functionality of product and the convenience of purchase. Strippers, for instance, typically enter a market with a bare-bones offering, reduced in function and usually in convenience. Industry leaders have significant advantages for combating low-end competition, but they often hesitate because they're afraid their actions will adversely affect their current profit margins. The answer, then, is to find the response that is most likely to restore market calm in the least disruptive way. An industry leader could choose to ride out the challenge by ignoring, blocking or acquiring the low-end competitor. Or it could decide to strengthen its own value proposition by adding new price points, increasing its level of benefits or dropping its prices. Such tactics can be effective in the short term, but the industry leader also needs to consider strategic retreat, particularly when certain conditions make future low-end challenges inevitable.

The authors argue that contemporary management education does a disservice by standardizing content, focusing on business functions (instead of managing practices) and training specialists (rather than general managers). Working with several major international universities, the authors have developed a vision of management education that grounds MBA programs in practical experiences, shared insights and reflection. They suggest that management education be limited to working managers nominated by their companies, thus allowing them to apply their knowledge directly and immediately to actual management practice. They assert that business schools must make management education more directly applicable to a manager's own experiences, shaping the curriculum through interaction between instructor and student. They also recommend that managers be encouraged to share with their work colleagues specific lessons derived from their education. The goal of this reshaping of management education, say the authors, is for business schools to fully integrate experience, theory and reflection, encouraging managers to incorporate this philosophy directly into the daily functioning of their workplaces.

One of the most thoroughly studied questions in business is how, at budgeting time, large corporations should choose among investment opportunities. Why, then, are so many senior executives frustrated with the process and convinced that their companies' capital is not being invested as well as it could be? One reason is that even the best-designed systems can be trumped by the power of personality. It has become commonplace, in fact, for talented and charismatic managers to spin, manipulate and otherwise cajole senior management into funding their business ideas -- often in the face of numbers that would, on their own, dictate a negative decision. Having guided dozens of major corporations through the budgeting process and watched hundreds of presentations by line managers asking for capital, the authors have profiled five archetypes of bad behavior commonly used by managers to subvert decision-making standards and win resources. They also explain how senior managers can counteract such behavior and instill values that lead to better use of investment capital.

In recent years, a "postcompany" school of business experts has argued that leaps in information technology have made possible a new world of seamless collaboration among businesses, one that will bring enormous gains in efficiency and flexibility. Indeed, the experts counsel, executives should look for opportunities to tear down the "walls" around their organizations, merging their companies into amorphous "enterprise networks" or "business webs." The author concedes that the universal IT infrastructure that has been developed over the past decade does create pressures to homogenize business processes and organizations. But he warns that it is dangerous for companies to assume that the "death of distance" brought about by new communications technologies will mean the death of the company. New technologies will never conquer cutthroat competition, and managers need to be wary of alliances, outsourcing contracts and specialization initiatives that foreclose opportunities for advantage and put long-term profitability at risk. Companies will always need the walls they have so carefully erected over the years to protect their advantages.

Most consumption experiences that people have are the routine stuff of life -- filling the gas tank, buying groceries, grabbing a quick lunch. Such tasks for the most part are neither fun nor painful; they're simply things that need to get checked off the list. Indeed, the authors say, they are so neutral that people often choose the seller with little thought and forget the experience in a matter of hours. Some providers of neutral services want to keep things that way. They want to be so convenient and reliable that people continue to use them unthinkingly. For certain mature service businesses, however, the addition of fun can be an important differentiator. The authors present three case studies taken from industries not known for fun -- furniture retailing, consumer banking and the grocery business -- to show how it can be turned to profitable advantage. Jordan's Furniture, Commerce Bank and Stew Leonard's operate their basic business models at a very high standard of excellence. But they also have what it takes to make a routine experience into something positive: strong leadership, a clear vision, a discriminating filter for new employees, a focus on hiring for attitudes rather than skills, and the ability to come up with the unexpected. The authors offer some general guidelines and cautionary notes to help managers who may want to try to emulate these successful companies.

Some observers see outsourcing as a key trend (perhaps even the key trend) shaping the future of human resources (HR). They envision HR departments focused entirely on strategic activities, leaving all the transactional and administrative activities to vendors. But, the author cautions that outsourcing any business activity creates potential risks as well as benefits: Companies can find themselves overly dependent on suppliers, and they can lose strength in strategically core competencies. Given the importance of the outsourcing decision and the amount of academic and practitioner literature on it, there is surprisingly little consensus about the topic, says the author, probably because of the multiplicity and complexity of the factors involved. The author synthesizes the strongest of the available research and identifies the six key factors that companies should consider when making important outsourcing decisions. The framework, which helps assess the pros and cons of outsourcing, can be applied specifically to HR functions. In particular, it can help explicate the managerial issues of outsourcing agreements such as the recent landmark deal between BP and Exult Inc. That $600 million, seven-year arrangement provides a window into the many opportunities -- and complexities -- of HR outsourcing.

In the wake of corporate scandals and ensuing concerns about board oversight, various suggestions for reforming boards and redefining the role of directors have been put forward. The proposals have focused on issues such as board composition and ways to ensure board independence from management. Such recommendations, while useful, do not deal with the fact that directors, no matter how dedicated and diligent, cannot serve as adequate monitors of management without sufficient information and the means to analyze it. The author urges companies to provide directors with that information in the form of detailed discounted-cash-flow (DCF) valuation models & #8212; the tool that can help them understand how the company intends to create value over time. In conjunction with observed financial results, review of the evolution through time of the valuation models can give directors the critical information they need to discharge their duties to shareholders. The author stipulates that DCF models are not the silver bullet that will forever safeguard investors from management chicanery & #8212; the models can be manipulated. But a sequence of DCF models serves two important purposes. It forces management to translate its vision into specific numbers that show how shareholder value will be created, and it forces the board to continually monitor and evaluate those numbers in light of ongoing financial performance and stock market valuation.

When it comes to thinking about scale, the assumption of corporate leaders since Henry Ford’s day has been that bigger is better. And in many situations, such thinking is inarguably correct because of the cost efficiencies that size provides. But sometimes efficiencies can mask opportunities. In their research, the authors found that small-scale operations provide significant advantages in four areas. They allow companies to locate hot spots and tap into local knowledge networks; they make it possible to respond more rapidly to customer needs and to trends in regional demand; they enable companies to monitor potentially disruptive technologies; and they help hold down labor costs while developing managerial talent. Using case studies, the authors illustrate how companies in a wide variety of industries have found the hidden benefits of small-scale approaches to corporate needs. They conclude that executives who develop a deeper understanding of scale and learn when it is better to think small can have a potentially huge impact on their companies’ long-term success.

Many international business leaders consider a global mind-set desirable, but few know how to embed it companywide. A corporate global mind-set differs from having a few managers think globally. That comes first. But global thinking must be incorporated into an organization’s processes so that everyone knows how to handle the tug-of-war between local responsiveness and corporate efficiency. Two Northeastern University professors studied global companies and found that inculcating a corporate global mind-set lagged behind the will to do so. IBM made the most progress. Having originally overemphasized global consistency, it learned to embrace a more flexible approach, adopting global-policy-development teams, worldwide knowledge networks and appropriate performance measures. Unfortunately, many American executives regard globalization as pursuing standardized products through centralized decision making. In favoring global consistency, they often fail to secure local cooperation. Through a global mind-set, corporate-decision-making processes become more permeable to influences from beyond the home country. The authors show how managers can determine when an issue calls for a locally adaptive response, when it calls for a globally consistent response and when both elements are needed. The corporate global mind-set is a requirement for motivating a diverse and sprawling work force and giving it a common purpose.