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Case studies suggest that companies including Avon, Stonyfield Farm and Starbucks have benefited from marketing initiatives associating the company with a socially beneficial cause. But how should managers allocate dollars between social-cause marketing and other types of marketing programs? The authors use a market-research technique called "conjoint analysis" to help managers evaluate the relative benefits of various types of affinity marketing programs, including sponsorship of social causes, sports or entertainment events. Conjoint analysis involves creating a variety of hypothetical brand profiles that contain combinations of brand attributes; by asking consumers to rank the profiles, researchers can gain insights into how different brand attributes affect consumers' preferences. In several experiments, the authors used conjoint analysis to examine how consumers' responses to a brand of beer, milk or juice would be affected if the brand had a marketing affiliation with a social cause or with a sport or entertainment event. For some of the products studied, affiliations with social causes had more positive effects on consumer rankings than affiliations with sports or entertainment events. However, this was not always true; for example, it was not the case for the milk brands studied, suggesting that the effect of social-cause marketing initiatives may vary by industry. The authors also discuss how brand managers can use conjoint analysis to compare potential marketing initiatives.

Despite considerable research on customer retention and word-of-mouth referrals, it has always been difficult quantifying their contributions to the bottom line. Using a metric known as "net promoter score," the author believes firms can now measure the dollar value of customers based on satisfaction levels. The author administered a survey designed to assess customer relationships to thousands of customers in six industries. He determined that customers tend to cluster into one of three categories: promoters, passives and detractors. Promoters represent more than 80% of the positive referrals a company receives, while detractors represent more than 80% of the negative word-of-mouth. NPS is determined by subtracting the percentage of detractors from the percentage of promoters. Using this data, a firm can quantify the value of a customer by tracking five categories: retention rate, profit margins, spending, cost efficiencies and word-of-mouth. The firm can then use NPS to make strategic decisions by targeting its efforts to leverage the most value for its customer service dollar. For instance, American Express targets its promoters with premium credit cards in an effort to increase profitability, and GE sends cross-functional teams to its detractors in order to prevent the spread of negative word-of-mouth.

Global sourcing is an advanced but complex approach to sourcing and supply management. The authors use survey research to gauge the extent to which companies are currently practicing global sourcing, which involves integrating and coordinating common items, materials, processes, technologies, designs and suppliers across worldwide buying, design and operating locations. In a sample consisting of supply executives primarily from large North American-based multinationals -- particularly manufacturers, the majority of survey respondents said their companies practice some form of international purchasing, a less integrated and coordinated approach than global sourcing. However, more than 70% of managers surveyed said that their companies plan to use global sourcing in the future. The authors identify a set of features common among companies that excel at global sourcing. The features cluster into seven broad characteristics: executive commitment to global sourcing; rigorous and well-defined global sourcing processes; availability of resources needed for the global sourcing initiative, including access to qualified personnel and budgets; information technology systems that support data analysis on a worldwide level; organizational design features that support the initiative, such as an executive committee that oversees global sourcing; structured approaches to communication, such as regular strategy review sessions; and methodologies for measuring savings from global sourcing.

The growing popularity of mobile hand-held devices is opening up intriguing new possibilities for what the authors refer to as "brand in the hand" marketing. Because individuals can be, and often are, connected anytime and anyplace, mobile marketing can be used to collect data through the wireless Internet to determine not only the exact location of a consumer at a given time, but also why that individual might be there. With that information, more meaningful or relevant advertising messages or promotions can be delivered to the consumer on a mobile device. Before companies rush into this new marketing arena, though, they need to understand some fundamental issues. How does mobile marketing differ from traditional approaches? When should a company pursue a "brand in the hand" initiative? Does mobile marketing have to be integrated within an overall marketing strategy and, if so, how? Moreover, how should companies address privacy issues? These are of particular concern, in part because of the personal nature of mobile devices.

Most managers see strategy development as serious business. It is ironic, then, that some of the most remarkable strategic breakthroughs in organizations emerge not from well-ordered processes but from messy, ambiguous and sometimes irrational activities -- pursuits that can best be described as play. Referring to research in the fields of developmental psychology and anthropology, the authors argue that play can stimulate the development of cognitive, interpretive skills and engender an emotional sense of fulfillment. It can help establish a safe environment for introducing new ideas about market opportunities, generating debate about important strategic issues, challenging old assumptions and building a sense of common purpose. The authors draw on their own experiences working with managers at the Imagination Lab Foundation and Templeton College, Oxford University, and they make sure to point out that play is no substitute for rational, conventional strategy development. Indeed, after the creative sessions are over, plenty of hard work remains to translate the ideas and insights into processes and actions. However, the authors argue that organizations seeking to differentiate themselves from competitors and overcome strategic obstacles can benefit by making time for managers to interact creatively with follow-up on the insights that emerge.

Corporate executives typically have strategic explanations for their acquisitions: that buying the company in question makes sense geographically or that the products are synergistic. However, if you inquire two years later how the company has benefited, managers tend to focus on the "softer" factors with comments like, "They made us rethink our decision-making processes," or "They introduced us to a new approach to product development," or simply "They shook up our culture." To understand this apparent contradiction, the author analyzes the acquisitions and performance of a number of large, successful companies. Several of the companies included in the research suffered from rigidity. However, the author found that companies were able to use acquisitions to restore a sense of vitality to their businesses and unleash a subsequent surge in performance. The acquired companies often stimulated the acquiring companies to develop new perspectives and different ways of doing things at critical times. Acquisitions kept their organizations fresh and vital. Even if the enterprises did not pursue acquisitions for this reason, the process of buying businesses and deciding how to integrate them into their corporate structures enabled acquirers to renew themselves before their products and operating methods became outdated.

For several decades, research about large companies' internal corporate venturing has shown that such activities frequently exhibit substantial cyclicality. Companies may enthusiastically launch ICV initiatives, later shut them down, and still later launch new ICV programs again. In this article, the authors describe four common situations that occur in cycles of corporate venturing. They argue that, unless properly managed, corporate commitment to ICV is apt to fluctuate according to the availability of uncommitted financial resources and the growth prospects of the organization's primary businesses. For example, if the corporation has uncommitted financial resources but the growth prospects of the main business are perceived to be insufficient, then the company may launch a top-down "all-out ICV drive" that is vulnerable to costly mistakes. If, however, the growth prospects of the primary business are perceived to be adequate and there are few uncommitted financial resources, top management is likely to perceive ICV as largely irrelevant. The authors examine factors contributing to ICV cyclicality; they then suggest that companies can achieve better outcomes if executives recognize the strategic importance of internal corporate venturing activities and view them as a way of gaining insights into emerging opportunities.

Information technology is undergoing an inexorable shift from being an asset that companies own -- in the form of computers, software and myriad related components -- to being a service that they purchase from utility providers. Three technological advances are enabling this change: virtualization, grid computing and Web services. Virtualization erases the differences between proprietary computing platforms, enabling applications designed to run on one operating system to be deployed elsewhere. Grid computing allows large numbers of hardware components, such as servers or disk drives, to effectively act as a single device, pooling their capacity and allocating it automatically to different jobs. Web services standardize the interfaces between applications, turning them into modules that can be assembled and disassembled easily. The resulting industry will likely have three major components. At the center will be the IT utilities themselves -- big companies that will maintain core computing resources in central plants and distribute them to end users. Serving the utilities will be a diverse array of component suppliers -- the makers of computers, storage units, networking gear, operating and utility software, and applications. And finally, large network operators will maintain the ultrahigh-capacity data communication lines needed for the system to work. IT's shift from an in-house capital asset to a centralized utility service will overturn strategic and operating assumptions, alter industrial economics, upset markets and pose daunting challenges to every user and vendor. The history of the commercial application of IT has been characterized by astounding leaps, but nothing that has come before -- not even the introduction of the personal computer or the opening of the Internet -- will match the upheaval that lies just over the horizon.

How do managers and companies quickly transform new hires into productive employees, a process called "rapid on-boarding"? The authors contend that companies that are more successful at rapid on-boarding tend to use a relational approach, helping newcomers to rapidly establish a broad network of relationships with coworkers that they can tap to obtain the information they need to become productive. Most organizations realize the importance of integrating new employees, but many fail in this regard, often because of five pervasive myths about the process: (1) the best newcomers can fend for themselves, (2) a massive information dump allows newcomers to obtain what they need, (3) cursory introductions are all that's needed, (4) first assignments should be small, compact and quickly achievable, and (5) mentors are best for getting newcomers integrated. Because of those misconceptions, managers will frequently rely on certain taken-for-granted practices that can actually hinder new employees from becoming productive.

The marketing function has been under increasing pressure to deliver. Its challenge is to see new business opportunities before they become obvious, to lead the market and not be led, to have a proactive vision rather than a copycat mentality. To accomplish that, a ""facts-based"" analysis -- using quantitative data from customer surveys, market studies and other sources -- can help tremendously, but such approaches can sometimes be dysfunctional, leading to endless statistical analyses that obfuscate key points. Companies thus need a broadened approach to marketing research that takes into account conversations with customers, observations from the field and insights from executives, among other alternative sources of valuable information. The author enumerates seven key tasks that marketing must perform within an organization to enable -- not stifle -- innovation.