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Innovation is the mandate of the day, and it has companies increasingly looking outside of their own organizations for new ways to grow. At the same time, shrinking federal research budgets are forcing universities to find alternate sources of funding for their research efforts. Consequently, just as companies are searching for new capabilities, sources of knowledge and means of growth, universities are feeling the urge to come down from the ivory tower to do business with corporations in order to keep their labs open. The convergence of these circumstances results in an unprecedented opportunity for successful partnerships between universities and corporations, and universities are making this easier every day. Recent years have seen a steep increase in the number of university-sponsored industrial or corporate liaison programs aimed at increasing university funding from private sources. But, given their differing needs, universities and corporations approach collaboration from different perspectives. How can managers reconcile the various needs of the two types of institutions? Drawing upon 20 years of experience as a corporate liaison officer, the author examines how best to manage relationships between companies and universities. He suggests that one point of common ground in corporate and academic partnerships is mutual respect for the use of the scientific method to solve problems. In such a context, academics feel more comfortable entering into dialogue with corporations without fear of "selling out," and corporate interests shed their aversion to so-called "pure" research. This allows both parties to follow the author's advice of shifting from a transactional approach to a relational approach. He examines three case studies and identifies three key factors in their success: The relationships moved beyond short-term vendor relationships to become lasting partnerships that built new capabilities for the companies; senior management was highly involved; and the companies involved the university in their strategy, not merely in technical tasks or isolated business problems.

Strategy is a mechanism through which a company makes sense of the world around it. It is a collection of ideas about how the company intends to win, the source code upon which everything else depends. Because strategy can only capture a company's best thinking at a given point in time, the author argues that strategy, much like a software program, needs to be updated and refined as people gain new experience and knowledge. With traditional approaches to strategy development, the author argues, planning is optimized for the original targets; it is difficult to change directions once implementation is under way. Adaptive processes, by contrast, help companies create and adapt strategy quickly and iteratively, so that people can effectively triage issues and allocate resources in changing environments; they are optimized to identify the best ideas and to ensure that individuals throughout the organization have access to the latest version so that everyday actions can be aligned with the most important strategic insights. Since people throughout the organization play roles in the company's strategic success, strategy development needs to tap into ideas from everywhere. This requires opening up the process to people throughout the organization, permitting extensive face-to-face collaboration, and arranging for individuals other than senior executives to facilitate important strategic discussions. Drawing extensive comparisons with software development and using examples from companies including Metrowerks and Shamrock Foods Co., the author focuses on three major themes: having an iterative, or "spiral," approach versus a linear approach; organizing the strategy-making process around people rather than processes; and the recognition that in strategy there is no such thing as a "silver bullet." Most managers operate in settings that are too dynamic and complex for simple success recipes. Instead of seeking long-term sustainable advantage, good managers need to create sustaining advantages on an ongoing basis.

Media coverage is a key factor in creating a company's reputation, which has been shown to influence both operational and financial performance. Scorecard rankings are a popular form of determining corporate reputations vis-_-vis competitors, yet many executives justifiably consider opinion-poll-style scorecards to be little more than beauty contests. This article discusses two techniques for assessing media coverage in a way that can inform management action: profiling media communication about a company's actions and its products and services, and then examining the various facets of an organization's media reputation profile. Media profiling is an analysis of the specific words and phrases that people and journalists use to describe and evaluate a company. The authors illustrate the use of media profiling results in three exhibits that visually reflect important aspects of corporate reputation at a glance: "media salience," which shows the prominence of a company's media image, and "media tone" and "coverage breakout," which outline different aspects of company reputation. Using the example of Apple Inc., the authors show how media profiling immediately creates a discussion that informs management action. It does so by unpacking "message macrothemes," such as profitability or service, into microthemes that a journalist uses to discuss them. Focusing on microthemes quickly moves the discussion to an expansive language about corporate reputation. Executives and public relations managers can then prioritize their responses to various reputation scenarios. First, they should try to protect and enhance the company's good message themes, then address negative message themes head-on. For mixed message themes, managers should seek to understand both sides of the story.

Leadership mandates tend to fall into one of three major categories: continuity (we should continue business as usual), good to great (we’ve been doing fine, but we need to do even better) and turnaround (we need to make dramatic changes to survive). Myriad problems can arise when an executive is given one leadership mandate while others are operating under a different, conflicting set of directives. Such stealth mandates are no-win situations, leading to the executive constantly butting heads with his or her boss, colleagues and others in the organization. To identify the true leadership mandate for a position, executives need to ask three crucial questions about the business unit they lead: (1) What needs to be changed within the next 12 months? (2) What needs to be honored or maintained during the next 12 months? (3) What must be avoided at all costs? Different constituencies should be queried, including key customers, and each of the questions should elicit a discussion about technology, business processes, culture and people. When executives discover that a stealth mandate is in play, they need to renegotiate mandates. One important goal is to establish realistic frameworks that will then become the basis for their future performance evaluation. Of course this is much easier said than done. But when an executive continues to operate in the shadow of a stealth mandate, he or she is setting himself or herself up to fail.

Conventional wisdom has it that most innovations eventually become commodities, bought on the basis of price and nothing else. Citing a quotation by a Columbia Business School professor that epitomizes that point of view -- "In the long run, everything is a toaster" -- the author uses the technological history of toast to persuasively undermine that notion. Drawing on the wisdom of economists Ronald Coase, Paul Samuelson, John Maynard Keynes and Adam Smith, he makes a historical case that commodity is not destiny, and uses brands such as Starbucks, Evian, Dasani, Scott Paper, Yahoo and Google, Hoover and Dyson to illustrate the point. The danger, he says, is that executives, entrepreneurs and investors may buy into the commodity designation far more often than they should, making the commodity ideology a self-fulfilling prophecy. Businesses that believe that today's breakthrough is tomorrow's toaster understandably fear rapidly diminishing returns from their innovation investments, and the economics of "good enough" innovation become good enough. The potential of ideas is inherently undervalued. Sustainable innovation opportunities are either missed or dismissed. Intense price competition, the author argues, may not signal the prolific presence of substitutable commodities but rather an arid absence of innovation. That signal, he says, should give a clear and present incentive for executives and entrepreneurs to innovate in order to differentiate; to identify hidden or untapped potential for new value creation.

Meetings are a central fact of organizational life. As a vehicle for communication, they can be extremely valuable mechanisms for disseminating vision, crafting strategic plans, and developing responses to challenges and opportunities. They can also be helpful for gathering ideas, brainstorming, and generating higher levels of employee involvement. But too many meetings are seen as a waste of time -- as a source of frustration rather than enlightenment. The authors explore some basic questions: How much time do people really spend in meetings? Are employees burning out from meeting overload? To what extent do people consider their time in meetings unproductive? And how can companies use meeting time better? To answer these questions, they look at a variety of sources: research and application literature; their own experiences working with clients; and data from two multinational studies of employees (including one that provided the basis of an article titled "'Not Another Meeting!' Are Meeting Time Demands Related to Employee Well-Being?" Journal of Applied Psychology 91, no. 1 (2006): 86-96, by Rogelberg, Leach, Warr and Burnfield). Based on these inquiries, they offer insights into the world of meetings and how organizations can use them more effectively.

Responding to competitive pressures, a growing number of corporate managers are dismantling organizations and cultures that were built on selling particular products and replacing them with new structures designed to be more responsive to customer needs. The push to restructure around customers is more than a new management fad. It is supported by success stories at companies including IBM, Cummins India, Fidelity Investments and Imation. Companies transitioning from product-oriented to customer-centered organizations progress along a continuum. They begin with informal coordination to overcome the deficiencies of product or functional silos, adding integrating functions (such as key account managers and customer segment task forces) as needed. The market logic for becoming customer-focused is often compelling. In surveying 347 companies, the author found that companies that embraced this approach saw accountability for customer relationships improve, and information about customers was more readily shared. These companies were also easier to do business with, according to customers. However, the author found that transforming product-centered cultures can be difficult and that the potential benefits do not necessarily translate into superior performance.

Most large-scale change efforts fail to meet their expectations. A major problem is that even the most advanced change models will stumble when they face organizational designs and management practices that are inherently anti-change. The truth is that the effectiveness of change efforts is largely determined by organizational design, or how a company's structure, processes, reward systems and other features are orchestrated over time to support one another as well as the company's strategic intent, identity and capabilities. In a world that is perpetually changing, an organization's design must support the idea that the implementation and reimplementation of a strategy is a continuous process. However, a number of traditional organizational design features tend to discourage -- and not encourage -- change. Thus, to transform themselves into organizations that are "built to change," companies need to rethink a number of these basic design assumptions with respect to managing talent (forget about job descriptions and redefine the relationship between company and worker), reward systems (implement a "person-based" pay system), structure (redesign the organization to maximize its "surface area"), information and decision processes (scrap the annual-budget process and move decision making closer to the front lines), and leaders (replace hierarchical command-and-control with shared leadership).

Early research in e-commerce projected that online retailing would spiral into a never-ending price war, but recent research has shown that customers are more likely to pay higher prices to online retailers of high quality that they trust. But how do customers evaluate quality in online retailing? What are the specific aspects of an online transaction that customers value and use to distinguish one site from another? The authors explored these issues by surveying customers who had recently engaged in an online retail transaction to determine how they evaluate the quality of their experiences with online retailers. The results demonstrated that customers' perceptions of quality and satisfaction with online purchases depend upon three things: interaction with the Web site, delivery of the product and how prepared retailers are to address problems when they occur. Of the three, product delivery has the strongest influence on customers' satisfaction and future purchase intentions. The authors further break down each of the three aspects of quality to create a complete picture of what it takes to build a trusting relationship with customers in an e-commerce environment.

Innovation is typically a group effort, but how exactly do researchers collaborate with one another to innovate? To answer this question, the authors compiled a dataset identifying all co-authorship relationships of U.S. patent inventors from 1975 through 1999. That dataset revealed that the social network of innovators is a "small world," with various clusters of people interconnected by different "gatekeepers," individuals who bridge one group with another. Historically, engineers and scientists tended to work within local clusters of collaboration that were isolated within a company. Recently, though, people have become increasingly mobile, changing jobs with greater frequency, and these formerly isolated clusters have begun to interconnect into larger networks through which information flows more freely between companies. Such environments provide both strategic opportunity and potential threat: They can increase creativity within a company, but they also aid in the diffusion of creative knowledge to other firms through personnel and knowledge transfer. The trick, then, is to manage innovation in ways that exploit the opportunities while minimizing the risks.