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Companies have long used teams to solve problems: focus groups to explore customer needs, consumer surveys to understand the market and annual meetings to listen to shareholders. But the words “solve,” “explore,” “understand” and “listen” have now taken on a whole new meaning. Thanks to recent technologies, including many Web 2.0 applications, companies can now tap into “the collective” on a greater scale than ever before. Indeed, the increasing use of information markets, wikis, crowdsourcing, “the wisdom of crowds” concepts, social networks, collaborative software and other Web-based tools constitutes a paradigm shift in the way that many companies make decisions. Call it the emerging era of “Decisions 2.0.” But the proliferation of such technologies necessitates a framework for understanding what type of collective intelligence is possible (or not), desirable (or not) and affordable (or not) & #8212; and under what conditions. At a minimum, managers need to consider the following key issues: loss of control, diversity versus expertise, engagement, policing, intellectual property and mechanism design. By understanding such important issues, companies like Affinnova, Google, InnoCentive, Marketocracy and Threadless have successfully implemented Decisions 2.0 applications for a variety of purposes, including research and development, market research, customer service and knowledge management. The bottom line is this: For many problems that a company faces, there could well be a solution out there somewhere, far outside of the traditional places that managers might search, within or outside the organization. The trick, though, is to develop the right tool for locating that source and then tap into it.

Much lip service is given today to “values-based decision making,” with the implication that the underlying values are “good” values, occupying high moral ground. But the fact is that all decisions & #8212; whether highly ethical, grossly unethical or anywhere in between & #8212; are values-based. That is, a decision necessarily involves an implicit or explicit trade-off of values. The values represented in a particular decision are not always easy to identify and evaluate, however, and the shortcuts that people often take in decision making can make deeper analysis of values all the more difficult. This article presents a framework designed to explore the values implicit in decisions. Moving systematically from concrete consequences to higher-ordered values, the framework, embodied in a decision-mapping technique, helps the decision maker think through what is gained and what is given up as a result of a decision. It also encourages an expansion of choice options, motivates a more balanced view of positive and negative consequences, and provides insight into the dynamics of decision making. When good people at times say yes to bad & #8212; unethical or illegal & #8212; actions, there are four possible reasons: (a) the organization’s values are fuzzy to them, leading them to resort to undeveloped intuition and expedient criteria, (b) they may not be clear on their own values, (c) their interpretation of probability conveniently favors their a priori preferred option, or (d) they see no other options (they believe their hands are tied). Each of these possibilities reflects issues that senior managers need to account for directly in addressing ethical decision making in their organizations. Illustrating the framework through a case study based on actual events, the article aims to help managers build a culture that better integrates the organization’s values into staff members’ decisions.

Despite the general understanding that leaders learn from experience, only a few organizations, such as Toyota, Boeing and General Electric, have truly taken it to heart by putting programs into place specifically to take advantage of experiential learning. Most companies stay within a narrow comfort zone. They certainly encourage aspiring and emerging leaders to "get experience," to take on "stretch" assignments and to take risks. But they provide precious little guidance on how to learn from experience -- how to mine it for insight about leading and adapting to change over the course of one's life. Organizations generally don't look outside their industry, or business itself, for new approaches. Instead, a banking model of learning predominates -- a semi-industrial process in which cost per unit is the key performance measure and knowledge is something deposited in aspiring leaders' heads for later use. That is unfortunate, because organizations are missing the opportunity to develop leaders by integrating their life and work experiences, especially those experiences the authors call "crucibles." Crucible experiences can be thought of as a kind of superconcentrated form of leadership development. Surprisingly, the best examples of organizations that deliberately employ such alchemy do not come from the business world. The authors draw on lessons from The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, better known as the Mormons, and the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club to develop four lessons for helping to develop managers. First, both the Mormons and the Hells Angels demonstrate how it is possible to craft or convert core activities to serve as practice fields for leaders. Second, they engage in elaborate preparation before sending would-be leaders out into the field. Third, they provide a supporting infrastructure while members are in the midst of a crucible. Finally, they recognize the need for renewal in individuals and the organization.

Thanks to a variety of online social applications -- including blogs, social networking sites like MySpace, user-generated content sites like YouTube and countless communities across the Web -- people are increasingly connecting with and drawing power from one other. In fact, customers are now beginning to define their own perspective on companies and brands, a view that's often at odds with the image a business wants to project. But organizations need not be on the defensive. Indeed, some savvy executives have already been turning this groundswell of customer power to their advantage. To investigate how, the authors interviewed managers and employees at more than 100 companies that were rolling out social applications. From this research, they developed a strategic framework that businesses can use to implement social applications in a number of departments, including research and development, marketing, sales, customer support and operations. The potential benefits are numerous: Social applications can generate research insights, extend the reach of marketing, energize sales efforts, cut support costs and stoke the innovation process. (And for companies that tap into employee groundswells, the result can be increased opportunities for collaboration across departments and geographical locations, as well as greater productivity and decreased inefficiencies.) But the greatest benefit might be cultural, because social applications help weave two-way customer communications into the fabric of an organization. But anything that changes culture tends to face resistance, and this is especially true of social applications, because they require managers to embrace an unknown communications channel, one that responds poorly to attempts to control it. Based on an analysis of companies that succeeded or failed in deploying social applications, the authors have derived a number of key managerial recommendations for any organization attempting to harness the power of the groundswell.

Successful companies recognize that information technology can fundamentally alter the very nature of work. Such a transformation, however, often requires that an organization rethink its corporate strategy and remake its basic structure and processes. The authors, drawing on interviews with Schneider International as part of MIT's Management in the 1990s Research Program, show that the benefits to organizations are related to the extent that organizations adapt their internal structures, processes and culture to extract the greatest value from technology. Although IT has enabled the growth of new companies and even entire industries, these technologies have also transformed the opportunities and challenges facing established manufacturing and service firms. This article examines Schneider's implementation of technologies such as GPS and satellite tracking not only to improve dispatch but also to provide value to customer service such as pinpointing delivery times, driver availability and the ability to alter delivery pickup and drop-off locations. The authors demonstrate that if organizations invest in complementary assets (people skills, new organizational structures and new work processes) to support their IT, they can transform services into products that will evolve into yet more new services, creating a virtual spiral with enormous competitive advantages.

Advanced tools like computer simulations can significantly increase developers' problem-solving capacity as well as their productivity, enabling them to address categories of problems that would otherwise be impossible to tackle. This is particularly true in the pharmaceutical, aerospace, semiconductor and automotive industries, among others. Furthermore, state-of-the-art tools can enhance the communication and interaction among communities of developers, even those who are "distributed" in time and space. In short, new development tools (particularly those that exploit information technology) hold the promise of being faster, better and cheaper, which is why companies like Intel and BMW have made substantial investments in these technologies. But that enthusiasm should be tempered: New tools must first be integrated into a system that's already in place. It is important to remember that tools are embedded both within the organizations that deploy them and within the tasks the tools themselves are dedicated to performing. Moreover, each organization's approach to how people, processes and tools are integrated is unique -- a result of formal and informal routines, culture and habits. All too often, companies spend millions of dollars on tools that fail to deliver on their promise, and the culprit is typically not the technology itself but the use of the technology. When new tools are incorrectly integrated into an organization (or not integrated at all), they can actually inhibit performance, increase costs and cause innovation to founder. To avoid this, companies should beware three common pitfalls: (1) using new tools merely as substitutes, (2) adding -- instead of minimizing -- organizational interfaces and (3) changing tools but not people's behavior.

How do managers at firms that compete primarily in local markets stay abreast of broader industry trends and innovations? In this article, the authors highlight an interesting way in which managers at some smaller regional firms in the United States seek to combat forces of inertia and myopia in their businesses: by networking with managers of noncompeting firms that operate in the same industry but in other geographic regions. The authors call these networks “industry peer networks” (IPNs) and have conducted research into how common such networks are and how they function. In the United States, industry peer networks apparently originated in the auto-retailing industry in 1947, when an owner of several auto dealerships began bringing managers from those dealerships together to exchange ideas. The concept spread both geographically and into a number of other industries, and industry peer networks now exist in businesses ranging from advertising agencies to office furniture distributors. A typical industry peer network consists of a number of small groups, each containing no more than 20 managers from noncompeting companies. These groups usually have face-to-face meetings two to four times a year to discuss management issues; they often share confidential financial data with each other as well.

New products suffer from notoriously high failure rates. Many new products fail, not because of technical shortcomings, but because they simply have no market. Not surprisingly, then, studies have found that timely and reliable knowledge about customer preferences and requirements is the single most important area of information necessary for product development. To obtain such data, many organizations have made heavy -- but often unsuccessful -- investments in traditional market research. The authors provide an alternative. Companies including Threadless, Yamaha and Ryohin Keikaku have begun to integrate customers into the innovation process by soliciting new product concepts directly from them. These firms also ask for commitments from customers to purchase a new product before the companies commence final development and manufacturing. This process -- called "collective customer commitment"-- can help companies avoid costly product failures. In essence, collective customer commitment enables firms to serve a market segment efficiently without first having to identify that segment, and it helps convert expenditures in market research directly into sales.

Although the pursuit of opportunity promises outsized rewards to entrepreneurs and established enterprises, it also entails great uncertainty. The critical task of entrepreneurship lies in effectively managing the uncertainty inherent in trying something new. Some entrepreneurs foolishly try to ignore uncertainty; others go to the opposite extreme of attempting to avoid it altogether. Rather than ignore uncertainty or attempt to avoid it in the na_ve belief that every contingency can be anticipated, entrepreneurs should instead manage uncertainty by taking a disciplined approach. Over the past five years, the author conducted systematic research into how entrepreneurs manage the inevitable risks while pursuing opportunities. A synthesis of the research revealed that discipline -- and its byproduct, the successful management of uncertainty -- comes through the adoption of an iterative experimentation model. In this three-step process, an entrepreneur first formulates a working hypothesis about an opportunity, then assembles the resources to test the hypothesis, and finally designs and runs real-world experiments. Depending on the results of a round of experimentation, the entrepreneur may revise the hypothesis and run another experiment, harvest the value created through a sale, or abandon the hypothesis and pull the plug. The model provides insights into some of the most daunting questions entrepreneurs face -- including how to screen an opportunity, how much money to raise, when to make key hires and how to use limited resources most efficiently.

Traditional models for developing and managing corporate portfolios are based on financial frameworks, business synergies or leveraging core competencies into related businesses. In this article, the author goes beyond those traditional approaches and offers an alternative & #8212; the corporate sphere of influence. Like nations, says the author, companies build spheres of influence that protect their cores, project their power outward to weaken rivals and prepare the way for future moves. By recognizing the strategic purpose of each part of the portfolio, the sphere of influence model focuses attention on the company’s overall strategy, including how it wants to structure the division of product and geographic markets in an industry, which threats it will address or ignore, and how the company’s portfolio enhances or detracts from its competitive or alliance strategy. Thinking in terms of building a sphere of influence forces managers to draw together corporate- and business-level strategic analyses that are often treated as separate. The corporate-level concern about where to fight and the business-level concern about with whom and how to fight are brought together into a coherent view. In this article, the author defines the components of a sphere of influence and explains how senior executives can use his framework to assess their company’s current sphere and map their desired one. Then he offers examples of how companies have managed their spheres. He draws examples from a wide range of industries and companies, including Microsoft, Procter & ; Gamble, Johnson & ; Johnson, Anheuser-Busch, Nokia, Harley-Davidson and Mexican cement company CEMEX. For an extended discussion of how companies can leverage their spheres of influence to support their overall grand strategy, see “The Balance of Power,” by Richard D’Aveni (MIT Sloan Management Review 45, no. 4 [2004]: 46a-46i).