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The authors argue that contemporary management education does a disservice by standardizing content, focusing on business functions (instead of managing practices) and training specialists (rather than general managers). Working with several major international universities, the authors have developed a vision of management education that grounds MBA programs in practical experiences, shared insights and reflection. They suggest that management education be limited to working managers nominated by their companies, thus allowing them to apply their knowledge directly and immediately to actual management practice. They assert that business schools must make management education more directly applicable to a manager's own experiences, shaping the curriculum through interaction between instructor and student. They also recommend that managers be encouraged to share with their work colleagues specific lessons derived from their education. The goal of this reshaping of management education, say the authors, is for business schools to fully integrate experience, theory and reflection, encouraging managers to incorporate this philosophy directly into the daily functioning of their workplaces.

More than 15 years ago, Peter Drucker heralded the beginning of the knowledge era. Since then, companies have made many attempts to leverage what they know and to increase their workers' productivity. To bring together vast amounts of explicit knowledge, they have invested large sums in content repositories; to help people track down others with tacit expertise, they have experimented with open offices, mobile technologies and online directories. Much of this has been a waste of resources. In fact, five years ago Drucker likened our current understanding of knowledge- worker productivity to our understanding of manual-labor productivity in 1900. Translation: We've got a long way to go. To reorient managers more fruitfully, SMR asked three leading management thinkers to explain what we've learned and how we can do better in the future. For Hammer, the focus should be not on the worker but on work processes and eliminating non-value-adding work. Leonard contends that companies should foster master-apprentice relationships to get the most out of their knowledge. And Davenport urges companies not just to experiment with ways of improving knowledge-worker productivity (as many already do), but to carefully measure the results of their experiments in order to learn what works and what doesn't.

Today's managers acknowledge the importance of customer focus. Yet the costly customer efforts they usually implement rarely bring the promised gains. The reason? A superficial understanding of what customer focus really means. True customer focus involves comprehensive organizational change. As Baxter Healthcare, LexisNexis, IBM and BP are learning, the kind of customer focus that creates an advantage competitors have great difficulty copying calls for companywide transformation. The author's in-depth research over many years shows how 10 breakthroughs in thinking, remarkably consistent across industries, improve growth and profitability more effectively than customer-relationship-management software, loyalty programs or satisfaction surveys. She describes how, for example, the manager of Baxter Healthcare Corp. Germany got employees thinking of themselves as doing postoperative "home-recovery enhancement" instead of merely providing postoperative nutritional products to hospitals--and how that ultimately led to Baxter becoming indispensable to customers. When deep customer focus gets rooted in employee behavior, people at all levels become innovators.

The reason most organizations struggle to demonstrate business gains from information-technology investments is that their IT portfolio management (ITPM) is inadequate. Research at 130 companies, including Harrah's Entertainment, Waste Management and Blue Cross Blue Shield, shows that only 17% are at the advanced, or synchronized, stage of ITPM. Scrutiny of that 17% reveals best practices for successfully aligning IT with strategic goals. The key to bridging the business-technology divide and improving results is early communication. Not only must senior business managers understand more about how IT affects both strategy and the bottom line, CIOs need to learn to communicate the vision, strategies and goals of the IT organization in terms non-IT executives can understand. The most effective partnerships studied were those in which the CIO took initiative in discussing ITPM with business leaders and eventually transferred accountability to them. The most successful practitioners obtained cost savings of up to 40% of pre-ITPM budgets, better alignment between IT spending and business objectives, and greater central coordination of IT investments across the organization. By following certain specific steps to establish or upgrade ITPM and by benchmarking against synchronized companies, large organizations can make IT an integral part of their competitive advantage.

In the late 1990s, companies often bought huge quantities of IT for reasons that had nothing to do with their business models or long-term strategies. There was a “follow the pack” approach to IT investment that continues, to a lesser degree, today. For managers seeking to break away from fear-driven IT investment, the author suggests that they consider the operations of Inditex Group, a clothing manufacturer and retailer based in northwestern Spain and best known for its Zara stores. Although few would think first of this industry or region in a search for IT leaders, Inditex’s experience demonstrates that it is possible to select, adopt and leverage IT masterfully while spending very little on it. Inditex has higher operating profit and much better recent stock-price performance than any of its competitors, and the author believes that there is a direct connection between its financial performance and its IT excellence. For managers weary of me-too IT investment, he lays out the five general principles that underlie Inditex’s approach to technology spending.

In recent years, a "postcompany" school of business experts has argued that leaps in information technology have made possible a new world of seamless collaboration among businesses, one that will bring enormous gains in efficiency and flexibility. Indeed, the experts counsel, executives should look for opportunities to tear down the "walls" around their organizations, merging their companies into amorphous "enterprise networks" or "business webs." The author concedes that the universal IT infrastructure that has been developed over the past decade does create pressures to homogenize business processes and organizations. But he warns that it is dangerous for companies to assume that the "death of distance" brought about by new communications technologies will mean the death of the company. New technologies will never conquer cutthroat competition, and managers need to be wary of alliances, outsourcing contracts and specialization initiatives that foreclose opportunities for advantage and put long-term profitability at risk. Companies will always need the walls they have so carefully erected over the years to protect their advantages.

Offshoring, the increasingly common practice among U.S. and European companies of migrating business processes overseas to India, the Philippines, Ireland, China and elsewhere, is often seen as a negative phenomenon that suppresses domestic job markets. On the contrary, says the author, offshoring is a critical component of next-generation business design, a dynamic process of continually identifying how to deliver superior value to customers and shareholders. Companies such as General Electric, Intel, J.P. Morgan Chase, Allstate, Prudential, Dell, Cisco and Motorola have all adopted it in some form as they shift their managerial frames of reference toward the requirements of the global-network era. Companies would do well, the author advises, to think rationally -- not emotionally -- about offshoring's relevant issues: What are their core competencies? What form of governance is optimal? How will work will be distributed and integrated?

By one informed estimate from the late 1990s, three-quarters of the Fortune 100's total market capitalization was represented by intangible assets, such as patents, copyrights and trademarks. In this environment, cautions the author, IP management cannot be left to technology managers or corporate legal staff alone -- it must be a matter of concern for functional and business-unit leaders as well as a corporation's most senior officers. To realize the full value of their companies' intellectual property, top executives must seek answers to the following questions: How can the company use intellectual property rights to gain and sustain competitive advantage? How do IP rights affect the industry's structure? What options do IP rights offer vis-à-vis competitors? How can IP rights grant incumbency advantage and establish barriers to entry? How can IP rights help the company gain vertical power along the value chain? What organizational design accommodates an IP strategy most effectively? The author explores each question, drawing on such company examples as Nokia, Motorola, Novo Nordisk and Leo Pharma, in the process helping lead intellectual property rights out of their shadowy existence in patent and legal departments.

The author argues that the dominant challenge for the innovative firm may not be to command marketplace premiums for its innovation, but to strategically identify and opportunistically exploit subsidies for that innovation. For example, Microsoft's final stage of Windows 95 development was effectively subsidized to the tune of $900 million when the company drew upon a highly valuable technical population to test and help improve the quality of its new operating system. An innovation subsidy is the deliberate contributionof a business resource -- money, time, information, expertise, personnel or equipment -- in support of the development of a novel offering with no explicit expectation of a financial return. It is not, however, an outright donation or favor but rather the cost-effective bartering of resources by individuals and institutions that amounts to a gray-market mechanism for mitigating risk. (The article offers other subsidy scenarios referring to Gillette, 3M, IBM. Goldman Sachs and Citigroup.) The core differences in perceived and real risk among economic entities represent the richest source of ideas for opportunistic innovation subsidies. Such scenarios are clearly not merely about money, but about creating and managing relationships that tap the resources of a company's savviest customers. In the management of innovation risk, social capital can be as valuable as financial capital. Seeking out the innovation subsidy challenges firms to rethink the underlying economic relationships between their customers and suppliers.

In recent years, leaders at such high-profile companies as Xerox, Procter & ; Gamble, Lucent, Coca-Cola and Mattel have flamed out early in their tenures. Why did such promising and previously successful individuals fail so quickly in the CEO role? And why is such failure happening today with relatively high frequency? The individuals in charge bear some of the responsibility, of course. But the authors' research also uncovered other major forces at play. First is the impact of the predecessor CEO's actions on his or her successor's performance. While outgoing CEOs do not intend to contribute to the failure of their successors, their personal needs and actions can lay the groundwork for derailment. A second force is often the succession process itself. Once again, the outgoing CEO may be responsible, having failed to prepare a successor adequately; and the board is also often guilty of lack of oversight. A third reason for failure by new CEOs is their often narrow expertise and inability to set a proper context as a leader. The authors explore these issues and then offer advice to outgoing CEOs, directors and incoming leaders that may help them avoid the troubles that some companies have faced in making a leadership transition.