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Many studies have shown that the most treacherous time in the failure-strewn business of mergers comes when companies attempt to combine operations. Surprisingly, however, they often destroy value not as a result of inattention to detail but through excessive zeal in their integration efforts. That's because acquirers, recognizing the many potential dangers inherent in the merger process, often attempt to immunize themselves by painstakingly mapping out comprehensive, detailed plans for blending every aspect of operations. What they don't realize is that too much integration can block companies from realizing the benefits of a merger just as easily as too little can. And, in some cases, overintegrating can do far more damage. The authors posit that M&;A activity is typically based on one of three types of "investment theses"-- "active investing," growing scope and growing scale -- and that each requires different degrees of merger integration. If an acquired company is the first plank of a new platform in a venture-capitalist firm's portfolio, for example, it will probably require the bare minimum of integration. But deals that enhance scope or scale require executives to pay much more attention to integration. The authors explain how Illinois Tool Works, Sears, Roebuck and Co., BP, Philips Medical Systems and Keppel Offshore & ; Marine have all benefited from integrating selectively, comprehensively or with a mix of the two, according to whether they were seeking economies of scale or scope.

Natural disasters, labor disputes, terrorism and more mundane risks can seriously disrupt or delay the flow of material, information and cash through an organization’s supply chain. The authors assert that how well a company fares against such threats will depend on its level of preparedness, and the type of disruption. Each supply-chain risk & #8212; to forecasts, information systems, intellectual property, procurement, inventory and capacity & #8212; has its own drivers and effective mitigation strategies. To avoid lost sales, increased costs or both, managers need to tailor proven risk-reduction strategies to their organizations. Managing supply-chain risk is difficult, however. Dell, Toyota, Motorola and other leading manufacturers excel at identifying and neutralizing supply-chain risks through a delicate balancing act: keeping inventory, capacity and related elements at appropriate levels across the entire supply chain in a rapidly changing environment. Organizations can prepare for or avoid delays by “smart sizing” their capacity and inventory. The manager serves as a kind of financial portfolio manager, seeking to achieve the highest achievable profits (reward) for varying levels of supply-chain risk. The authors recommend a powerful “what if?” team exercise called “stress testing” to identify potentially weak links in the supply chain. Armed with this shared understanding, companies can then select the best mitigation strategy: holding “reserves,” pooling inventory, using redundant suppliers, balancing capacity and inventory, implementing robust backup and recovery systems, adjusting pricing and incentives, bringing or keeping production in-house, and using Continuous Replenishment Programs (CRP), Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) and other supply-chain initiatives.

Technological diversity and organizational structure both shape an alliance’s potential payoff.

Although large-scale risks such as war, terrorism and natural disaster garner media attention, it is the everyday, small-scale risks associated with opacity -- a lack of transparency in countries' legal, economic, regulatory and governance structures -- that can confound global investment and commerce. The authors offer new research that identifies the causes and measures the effects of this phenomenon across 48 countries. The research draws upon 65 objective variables from 41 sources including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Securities Services Association, the "International Country Risk Guide" and individual country's regulators. The authors' methodology projects which aspects of a country's economy carry the greatest risk, then, by assessing and comparing the costs of those risks on a country-by-country basis, they create an overall Opacity Index. Next they correlate the Opacity Index to a variety of other indicators, including a country's income level, economic development and foreign investment, entrepreneurship, and access to capital and lending and equity markets. The authors conclude that opacity strongly correlates overall with slower growth and less foreign direct investment in nearly all markets, and they suggest how information about opacity and its contributing factors can enhance both managerial and national policy decisions alike.

Many companies prefer employees with deep motivation, strong commitment, unquestioned loyalty and widely shared values. But the author says that employing such highly involved people can have serious drawbacks for the company. For starters, deeply motivated people can be a challenge for management because they tend to interpret organizational purposes in their own way, sometimes substituting their own purposes for the company objectives without even realizing it. Deeply motivated individuals are also likely to display strong resentment when the organization fails to fulfill the needs or desires they are so imbued with. Not surprisingly, deeply motivated people are not easy to get along with: They don't comply with rules or policies that they don't fully respect; they believe they should have a say in almost everything; and they tend to behave like the owners they are not (but wish they were). Similarly, people who are strongly committed are likely to develop excessive confidence in the face of difficulties. They can be blind to warning signs, which can lead to excessive delays in corrective actions. Strongly committed people are also prone to believing that the end justifies the means, which can lead to unethical behavior. Given such drawbacks, the author contends that companies might be better off with employees who have a moderate -- instead of excessive -- level of motivation, commitment and loyalty.

Brands are an indispensable part of modern business. That is true in large measure because of a brand's remarkable efficiency in "aggregating" consumers -- reaching large numbers of people with a promise to deliver a clearly stated benefit that sets it apart from competitors. But the information revolution is undermining the logic of aggregation, the very source of brand power. In fact, it is becoming evident that in an information-rich environment, consumer disaggregation is vastly more efficient and profitable than aggregation. Using customized publications, e-mail, direct mail, Web sites and call centers that are based on a common platform of consumer information, companies are demonstrating that they can effectively and efficiently drive consumer behavior through two-way communications. Common underlying databases ensure that each interaction is personalized, regardless of the channel through which it occurs. And each interaction with the consumer builds the consumer database further, making future interactions even richer. The implications of the information revolution for the role of brands in business are far-reaching. Many of the strategic and tactical tasks entrusted to brands can now be performed better, less expensively and more profitably at the level of consumer segments. And companies' brand-centric structures are not suited to marketing initiatives that are based on reaching segments or individuals. Given this changed environment, the author calls on companies to rethink three core areas of brand management: the consumer relationship, the channel relationship and the organization of brand management. To support his case, he draws on detailed examples involving Kraft, Procter & ; Gamble and Tesco.

The health care system in the United States is in crisis, and the implications for businesses and their employees are profound. As employers struggle with unrelenting double-digit health-insurance cost increases, some firms have decided to drop coverage entirely, and many others have shifted costs to employees. Meanwhile, the quality of the health care being paid for by companies and their workers remains highly uneven. On its own, business cannot solve the health care crisis in all its aspects, but that doesn't mean it can't do a lot to improve the system. Some companies are taking more active control over the issue and getting better results on both cost and quality. To learn from such companies and from those who influence and deliver health care services, the authors conducted in-depth interviews with thought leaders in business, health care and related sectors. The overriding lesson from their research: Companies must build bridges to other players in the system to address the systemic problems that transcend even the most powerful corporations. They propose a partnership-based health care agenda for business that will benefit not only companies and employees but also health care overall by strengthening the market mechanism and encouraging fruitful collaboration.

Food giant Kellogg Co. struggled throughout the 1990s, as both the stature of its legendary brands and its profit margins declined. A noted business journalist describes how the appointment of Carlos Gutierrez as CEO and the loss of market leadership to General Mills Inc. in 1999 forced Kellogg to establish a more meaningful, sustainable profit-oriented focus in recent years and outlines Kellogg's ambitious program of change. New business models emphasized value (rather than volume) growth and encouraged stronger cash flow. Realism was restored to financial forecasts, brand unit operations more closely integrated and employee compensation tied directly to business unit performance. New product launch documents stopped evaluating margins by volume alone, and innovation specialists were encouraged to add value-added touches to existing brands. As a result of this change in strategy, says the author, Kellogg's fortunes have improved dramatically. New product launches based on existing products have done well. And the company is better able to access its healthy food roots by playing up the health benefits of key products. Most importantly, says the author, a return to strong profitable growth and increasing market confidence in the company serves as further evidence of the strategy's success.

For a firm to succeed over the long term it needs to master both adaptability and alignment -- an attribute sometimes referred to as ambidexterity. The concept is alluring, but the evidence suggests that most companies have struggled to apply it. The standard approach has been to create separate structures for different types of activities. But separation can also lead to isolation, and many R&;D and business development groups have failed because of their lack of linkages to the core businesses. In an attempt to shed new light on the discussion, the authors develop and explore their concept of contextual ambidexterity, which calls for individual employees to make choices between alignment-oriented and adaptation-oriented activities in the context of their day-to-day work. The authors introduce this as a complementary concept to traditional structural ambidexterity. By means of their survey- and interview-based research -- which took place over a three-year period and involved 4,195 respondents across 41 business units in 10 multinational firms -- the authors identify the four behaviors displayed by ambidextrous individuals, each of which involves taking independent, adaptive action in the service of overall company goals. They then present a framework for describing and analyzing which organizational contexts encourage or discourage such behaviors. They link organizational context to ambidexterity and, in turn, ambidexterity to high performance. Finally, the authors describe how companies such as Nokia, Ericsson, Oracle and Renault have been able to create such high performance contexts, and they offer managers guidance on how to create them in their own companies.

Traditional models for developing and managing corporate portfolios are based on financial frameworks, business synergies or leveraging core competencies into related businesses. In this article, the author goes beyond those traditional approaches and offers an alternative & #8212; the corporate sphere of influence. Like nations, says the author, companies build spheres of influence that protect their cores, project their power outward to weaken rivals and prepare the way for future moves. By recognizing the strategic purpose of each part of the portfolio, the sphere of influence model focuses attention on the company’s overall strategy, including how it wants to structure the division of product and geographic markets in an industry, which threats it will address or ignore, and how the company’s portfolio enhances or detracts from its competitive or alliance strategy. Thinking in terms of building a sphere of influence forces managers to draw together corporate- and business-level strategic analyses that are often treated as separate. The corporate-level concern about where to fight and the business-level concern about with whom and how to fight are brought together into a coherent view. In this article, the author defines the components of a sphere of influence and explains how senior executives can use his framework to assess their company’s current sphere and map their desired one. Then he offers examples of how companies have managed their spheres. He draws examples from a wide range of industries and companies, including Microsoft, Procter & ; Gamble, Johnson & ; Johnson, Anheuser-Busch, Nokia, Harley-Davidson and Mexican cement company CEMEX. For an extended discussion of how companies can leverage their spheres of influence to support their overall grand strategy, see “The Balance of Power,” by Richard D’Aveni (MIT Sloan Management Review 45, no. 4 [2004]: 46a-46i).