Search Results

The principle that financial markets accurately reflect the underlying value of traded stocks has been widely accepted in the investment world since the 1960s. It is predicated on the assumption that investors make buy or sell decisions based on a rational view of a company's future cash flow, after considering all the relevant information. The role of the markets is to allocate capital to companies efficiently. Recently, however, this rational view has been under attack from adherents of behavioral finance, who argue that stock markets do not reflect economic fundamentals as well as people think they do. The authors maintain that there are instances when stock market valuations can and do make significant and lasting deviations from a company's intrinsic value. However, according to the authors' analysis, the significant discrepancies between market value and intrinsic value are both rare and short-lived. The article cites several examples, including the late 1970s, when inflation-conscious investors pushed stock valuations too low, and the "Internet bubble" of the late 1990s. On the whole, the authors argue, financial markets value investments efficiently -- even if some people invest irrationally some of the time. Although managers may occasionally find ways to take advantage of short-term discrepancies, the authors say the only way they will be able to do so is by understanding the real underlying values.

In this article, the authors review various streams of research suggesting that although companies are increasingly under pressure to manage conflicting or difficult-to-reconcile stakeholder demands, managers are still largely behind the curve in recognizing, justifying and developing the capabilities to do so. In contrast to primary stakeholders such as customers, suppliers and shareholders, secondary stakeholders are often difficult to identify beforehand, or they may not be willing or able to engage, negotiate, compromise or clearly articulate their positions -- a phenomenon the authors refer to as stakeholder ambiguity. Citing examples involving companies such as Monsanto, Conoco-Philips, Texaco and the French oil company Perenco, the authors present research indicating that managers are often ill-prepared to deal with the idiosyncratic and context-specific nature of stakeholder ambiguity and typically revert to formulaic decision-making frameworks, such as discounted cash flow and cost-benefit analysis, which misrepresent the challenges. Some research indicates that stakeholder ambiguity may actually erode the competitive advantage of large multinationals. Although such companies possess significant competencies, technological capabilities and economies of scale, they may be at a disadvantage when trying to determine and align the interests of secondary stakeholders.

Recent research has greatly improved management's ability to anticipate customer wants.

The importance of properly identifying the strategies, and anticipating the actions, of rivals.

To succeed, executives must manage a myriad of relationships.

Corporate executives typically have strategic explanations for their acquisitions: that buying the company in question makes sense geographically or that the products are synergistic. However, if you inquire two years later how the company has benefited, managers tend to focus on the "softer" factors with comments like, "They made us rethink our decision-making processes," or "They introduced us to a new approach to product development," or simply "They shook up our culture." To understand this apparent contradiction, the author analyzes the acquisitions and performance of a number of large, successful companies. Several of the companies included in the research suffered from rigidity. However, the author found that companies were able to use acquisitions to restore a sense of vitality to their businesses and unleash a subsequent surge in performance. The acquired companies often stimulated the acquiring companies to develop new perspectives and different ways of doing things at critical times. Acquisitions kept their organizations fresh and vital. Even if the enterprises did not pursue acquisitions for this reason, the process of buying businesses and deciding how to integrate them into their corporate structures enabled acquirers to renew themselves before their products and operating methods became outdated.

Good communication is a prerequisite for good teamwork. But how much is enough?

A new report reveals that companies with significant levels of employee control systematically underperform.

This article contends that companies' traditional approach to purchasing misses the function's significant potential to add value by driving innovation and superior long-term cost performance. As a former senior vice president of technical purchasing for BMW, the author oversaw the transformation of the department's mission from functional to strategic, and he offers insights about the transformation. Strategic purchasing, he says, can only be effective if the purchasing department constantly expands and updates its technical knowledge to preserve credibility with both suppliers and internal departments. Toward that end, BMW's purchasing agents spent up to 20% of their time training -- in everything from foreign languages to technical know-how to contract law. In addition, BMW began to hire industry experts and train them as buyers who had as much in-depth knowledge as the suppliers with whom they would be dealing. The author describes how BMW associates become involved at the early concept stage of product development, often suggesting how certain design features will affect the technical equipment at the factory or the level of investment that will be required to execute the design. They also suggest what types of materials, components and systems best meet end-user requirements.

For several decades, research about large companies' internal corporate venturing has shown that such activities frequently exhibit substantial cyclicality. Companies may enthusiastically launch ICV initiatives, later shut them down, and still later launch new ICV programs again. In this article, the authors describe four common situations that occur in cycles of corporate venturing. They argue that, unless properly managed, corporate commitment to ICV is apt to fluctuate according to the availability of uncommitted financial resources and the growth prospects of the organization's primary businesses. For example, if the corporation has uncommitted financial resources but the growth prospects of the main business are perceived to be insufficient, then the company may launch a top-down "all-out ICV drive" that is vulnerable to costly mistakes. If, however, the growth prospects of the primary business are perceived to be adequate and there are few uncommitted financial resources, top management is likely to perceive ICV as largely irrelevant. The authors examine factors contributing to ICV cyclicality; they then suggest that companies can achieve better outcomes if executives recognize the strategic importance of internal corporate venturing activities and view them as a way of gaining insights into emerging opportunities.