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To find out how well you are serving your customers, ask your employees.

The author examines the questions of why individuals behave the way they do and if there is a natural impulse to do good. This article discusses such issues as whether an individual, pursuing his or her own self-interest, can improve the general welfare and whether people have an innate intuition that leads them to do good. In coming to the conclusion that the pursuit of self-interest can produce a lot of good if it is balanced with a bit of societal guidance, the author brings to light issues of corporate governance, performance pay, legal and monetary incentives, and other forms of regulation. It is in these arenas, the author points out, that intuition, rather than a more empirical approach, can best be put to good use. He argues that intuition has been lacking from the more utilitarian view of economics and management and that, generally speaking, a blend of both approaches is optimal.

When targeted promotions appeal to non-targeted customers.

Multinationals are finding it increasingly important to match the strengths of their subsidiaries' host economics to their strategic needs.

Advanced tools like computer simulations can significantly increase developers' problem-solving capacity as well as their productivity, enabling them to address categories of problems that would otherwise be impossible to tackle. This is particularly true in the pharmaceutical, aerospace, semiconductor and automotive industries, among others. Furthermore, state-of-the-art tools can enhance the communication and interaction among communities of developers, even those who are "distributed" in time and space. In short, new development tools (particularly those that exploit information technology) hold the promise of being faster, better and cheaper, which is why companies like Intel and BMW have made substantial investments in these technologies. But that enthusiasm should be tempered: New tools must first be integrated into a system that's already in place. It is important to remember that tools are embedded both within the organizations that deploy them and within the tasks the tools themselves are dedicated to performing. Moreover, each organization's approach to how people, processes and tools are integrated is unique -- a result of formal and informal routines, culture and habits. All too often, companies spend millions of dollars on tools that fail to deliver on their promise, and the culprit is typically not the technology itself but the use of the technology. When new tools are incorrectly integrated into an organization (or not integrated at all), they can actually inhibit performance, increase costs and cause innovation to founder. To avoid this, companies should beware three common pitfalls: (1) using new tools merely as substitutes, (2) adding -- instead of minimizing -- organizational interfaces and (3) changing tools but not people's behavior.

Research has repeatedly demonstrated that managers contribute to a company's bottom line by enabling the emergence of work processes in constantly changing situations. But managers have received insufficient guidance about what exactly they should be doing to manage these emergent processes. The authors contend that managers must actively facilitate the confluence of participatory "spurts" of innovation. By examining the methods of companies such as Novell, IDS Scheer AG and Entergy, the authors identify four methods successful managers employ to address an emergent environment. First, these managers structure the work so that information, assumptions and interpretations are continually being challenged. Second, they accept that changing circumstance will continually require new knowledge and skill sets. Third, they understand that emergent processes involve unpredictable inputs from suppliers, employees, customers and other stakeholders. Lastly, they understand that they alone cannot induce participatory innovation, so they have learned to create or identify existing "reputation networks." Managers who have mastered these principles help their organizations to react so quickly to unpredictable events that the reactions often appear to have been planned and preemptive.

How do managers at firms that compete primarily in local markets stay abreast of broader industry trends and innovations? In this article, the authors highlight an interesting way in which managers at some smaller regional firms in the United States seek to combat forces of inertia and myopia in their businesses: by networking with managers of noncompeting firms that operate in the same industry but in other geographic regions. The authors call these networks “industry peer networks” (IPNs) and have conducted research into how common such networks are and how they function. In the United States, industry peer networks apparently originated in the auto-retailing industry in 1947, when an owner of several auto dealerships began bringing managers from those dealerships together to exchange ideas. The concept spread both geographically and into a number of other industries, and industry peer networks now exist in businesses ranging from advertising agencies to office furniture distributors. A typical industry peer network consists of a number of small groups, each containing no more than 20 managers from noncompeting companies. These groups usually have face-to-face meetings two to four times a year to discuss management issues; they often share confidential financial data with each other as well.

Companies should evaluate an outsourced process on several dimensions and then tailor the contract accordingly.

Every sales cycle has some degree of inherent volatility. A big customer could, for instance, go bankrupt or a major deal could fall through. But there's one type of volatility that many executives seem to think is a kind of natural law: At the beginning of every quarter, sales tend to falter; at the end, they often surge. This roller coaster can be a huge problem when major deals fail to materialize at the end of the quarter, leaving a shortfall. According to the author, such kinks in the sales cycles can be smoothed out, but doing so requires a fundamental change in how sales activities are prioritized. The typical sales process is like a funnel: At the bottom are the deals that are nearest to being closed; in the middle are other prospects in the works; and above are numerous promising leads. Companies typically work their funnels from the bottom up. After all, why not concentrate on the surest opportunities first and leave the less certain ones for last? But that prioritization strategy is the fundamental cause of the sales roller coaster. The author of this article argues that for a more continuous -- and predictable -- revenue stream, firms should prioritize the three areas of the funnel in the following way: bottom, above and then middle.