Articles

People aren’t stupid "Ò they just often act that way. Noted behavioral economist Dan Ariely explains what that should mean for strategists.

Managers and directors alike face tough choices as they decide on the quality and quantity of information that the board receives and uses in its governance and fiduciary roles. As the fallout from recent crises such as the subprime mortgage debacle illustrates, both sides must address the problem of “information asymmetry” & #8212; the gap between the information available to management and to the board. The authors’ research suggests that tomorrow’s boardroom will be reshaped by three related forces: First, they face a thorough rethinking, brought on by concerned stakeholders, of directors’ information needs. In responding to these pressures, boards and management must overcome several impediments: caution about altering the dynamics of the present manager-director relationship; directors’ lack of needed skills for interpreting the new information; and the inertia of cultural norms. Second, they face dramatic improvements in the performance assessment approaches used to guide boards’ decision making. The core of a healthy information relationship between managers and directors is their agreement on the most useful performance metrics to track and assess. This selection enables the building of trust and an eased and more pertinent workload for the board (having been freed from the need to decode reams of data while also gaining some independence from management’s sometimes self-serving evaluations). Finally, boards and managers face the adoption of technologies that support critical board functions. Once access to such information is granted, new technologies can help directors obtain and use it. Board members may apply tools that, for example, enable improved visualizations and helpful alerts. And directors may engage in electronic “what-if” analyses, using company data as well as outside information & #8212; related, say, to competing firms & #8212; which is becoming increasingly available online.

To understand the financial crisis, view it as a systems accident.

Although top managers must project an image of professionalism and strength, they still require networks of individuals they can trust. The development of trust depends on the degree to which the executives perceive the presence of three critical attributes & #8212; ability, benevolence and integrity & #8212; within their support networks, and on their ability to match these qualities with the type of support they are seeking in any particular situation. We model the support being sought as having high or low informational complexity and high or low emotional demand. The combinations correspond to four types of support requested: raw information (low, low), actionable advice (high, low), emotional support (low, high), and strategic or political help (high, high). Meanwhile, the three critical attributes (each with either a high or low rating) translate into eight kinds of support providers: Trustworthy Partner, Harsh Truthteller, Moral Compass, Loyal Supporter, Star Player, Average Joe, Dealmaker and Cheerleader. Executives in need of actionable advice will most often turn to Trustworthy Partners or Harsh Truthtellers, given their high levels of ability and integrity. For strategic or political help, Trustworthy Partners will be sought because of their high levels of ability, benevolence and integrity. Seekers of emotional support will look to Loyal Supporters and Trustworthy Partners because they offer high levels of benevolence and integrity. And when the three facets of trust are less critical, executives will be willing to go to virtually any of their contacts for raw information, though most often they seek out Average Joes. These and other matches were observed, useful data was gathered and valuable insights were obtained when we tested our model on vice presidents, directors, general managers and other executives at a Fortune 50 technology firm.

Assessment tools for better-informing decisions have proliferated. Which ones work?

Despite research showing that mergers and acquisitions rarely provide significant shareholder value, there is no sign of any slowing in the trend toward M&;A. One of the major reasons why M&;A tend, to fail, argue the authors, is that the process often puts extreme stress on senior management teams. By nature, the process is an adversarial one, with management on both sides advocating for their stakeholders. When the dust clears at the end of the process, management is left, as the authors say, "to navigate the challenging segue from 'tough negotiator' to 'trusted colleague.' " The authors draw on the experience of Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, General Electric and Adobe to propose six guidelines for improving relations between the senior management teams of both sides of the M&;A equation. The first three guidelines should be undertaken as soon as possible in the integration process. The authors advise that you can reduce the defection of talented personnel by reducing role ambiguity as quickly as possible. They also urge due diligence about the talent you are acquiring as early in the process as possible, and preferably before the deal is finished. Third, they recommend allowing some "habits to die hard." Employees often rely on habits and long-standing procedures to remain comfortable, and many of them are what made the company successful in the first place. As the integration process continues, there are three more important guidelines to follow. First, acquirers should not tolerate "bad behavior" that can sabotage the integration process. Second, it is important to have patience with the new management team, as many of them will be in unfamiliar roles. Finally, the authors suggest that it is important to remember to celebrate the value of the deal for all involved. By trumpeting the value of the new team, you can increase communication and trust. Ultimately, this trust may lead to increased shareholder value for all involved.

The IBM Innovation Jam was the largest-ever event to promote networked idea generation. More than 150,000 IBM employees, stakeholders and vendors participated in two three-day online events to foster innovation and help IBM bring products to market faster. Using Web sites, wikis, forums and other online tools, Jam participants generated literally hundreds of thousands of new business ideas. From those ideas, IBM focused on several major topics for the second part of the Jam and invited its employees to build on the ideas within those topics. As a result of this process, 10 distinct businesses were funded. However, it wasn’t these successes that make the Jam interesting, argue the authors; it was the difficulties that IBM faced in implementing the Jam. Given unique access to the Jam, the authors discuss the complications inherent in collaborating with so many people. In particular, it was hard to sustain individual “conversations” in the collaborative process. Rather than building on each other’s ideas, many participants & #8212; because of excitement about their own ideas & #8212; would “hijack” a thread or take it in an unintended direction. Some great ideas were left to wither on the vine. The authors discuss other attempts at large-scale collaboration, including some by Dell and Starbucks. These include the use of promotion tools to ensure that “good” ideas are seen and captured by as many eyes as possible. The pros and cons of these methods are discussed as well, and the authors provide a framework for thinking about how an organization can collaborate with its stakeholders.

At top companies, where the inspired use of metrics helps to identify potential leaders and develop their skills, the answer is yes.

R&;D alliances with suppliers or universities are more likely to be fruitful.

In buyer-supplier relationships in which companies depend on one another, performance may improve.